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Environmental Challenges
Lori Ann T h rupp’s article, “Costa 
Rica’s Resource Challenges,” (Hemi­
sphere [W inter/Spring 1990]), is 
both provocative and frustratingly 
incomplete. O ne can hardly argue 
against her analysis of the severe 
and continuing degradation of the 
natural resources of Costa Rica. 
Likewise there is little question 
about the contradictory economic 
and environm ental policies of the 
government.
H er vision, however, seems par­
tial and shortsighted in many o ther 
respects. H er allusions to the major­
ity o f Costa Ricans’ lack o f interest 
in wildlife, tourism, and science are 
totally lacking in evidence. Indeed 
there is substantial evidence that 
carefully m anaged environmental 
projects no t only integrate local 
communities into the projects, but 
also help to raise their environm en­
tal consciousness. Daniel Janzen 
deserves praise rather than criti­
cism for saving one o f the last re­
m aining tropical dry forests in 
Central America. Prior to the estab­
lishment of Guanacaste National 
Park, the area was under im m inent 
threat of destruction from export- 
oriented cattle ranching. Blaming 
Janzen for perpetuating inequi­
table development, as T hrupp 
does, is ludicrous.
T hrupp also appears to ignore 
the m ajor initiatives o f the Costa 
Rican government through its Na­
tional Strategy for Sustainable De­
velopment. This policy, adopted 
after widespread public debate, is 
based exactly on what T hrupp ar­
gues: “that the social dimensions of 
conservation cannot be ignored 
and that the political-economic 
roots of the problem  must be di- 
recdy confronted.” This policy,
along with the new Regional Con­
servation Units, (see my article, 
“Saving Costa Rica’s Environm ent,” 
Hemisphere [Fall 1989]), attempts to 
do precisely that. O f course, it faces 
enorm ous potential resistance and 
obstacles and its effectiveness re­
mains to be proven.
I would suggest, however, that 
we contribute very little to solving 
Costa Rica’s problem s by dam ning 
the country’s dependence on ex­
port agriculture without offering 
solutions for handling the difficult 
transition between an export- 
oriented economy and a less- 
dependent, domestically oriented 
economy. Social justice is indeed a 
radical aim, but with intelligent 
planning it may also be a realistic 
goal.
Jack W. Hopkins 
School o f Public 
and Environmental Affairs 
Indiana University
A Promising Path?
In “An Informal Path to Develop­
m ent?” (Hemisphere [W inter/Spring 
1991]), Alejandro Portes criticizes 
The Other Path, by Peruvian econo­
mist H ernando de Soto. U nfortu­
nately Portes fails to support his 
contention that De Soto’s “message 
is little m ore than the long-familiar 
‘magic-of-the-marketplace’ doc­
trine.” W hat Portes gives us is a 
lame ideological diatribe, devoid 
of any analytical or policy alterna­
tive to De Soto’s work—a work 
based on exhaustive field research 
and a sound methodological frame­
work.
The primary reason for the 
international celebration o f De 
Soto’s book (which is subtitled 
The Invisible Revolution in the Third 
World) is that it provides a thor­
ough analysis and policy map, not 
only for solving problem s regard­
ing the subterranean (informal) 
sector bu t also for moving Third 
World economies toward a new de­
velopm ent path. De Soto’s book 
represents the freshest and most 
significant contribution to Third 
World developm ent policy in the 
last two decades. As such, the book 
did m uch to rescue international 
developm ent policy from a rapid 
slide into obscurity and irrele­
vance. Contrary to Portes’s asser­
tion, De Soto certainly did not 
“appropriate and reassert what was 
already known.”
The failure of the formal sector 
as an engine of growth and devel­
opm ent in the T hird World has 
given impetus to the informal 
economy. To be sure, the informal 
sector has failed to lower unemploy­
m ent rates, raise wages and salaries 
to keep pace with inflation, in­
crease the availability of basic 
goods and services, and improve 
the economic infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, it represents the 
T hird W orld’s citizenry’s spontane­
ous, creative, and rational response 
to the incapacity of national states 
to satisfy their basic needs. Poverty 
and misery have prom oted self- 
reliant, survival networks in the 
form of the informal sector. These 
networks are a sensible response to 
decades of economic oppression 
brought on by state-interventionist 
policies.
Portes’s notions concerning the 
benefits of subsidized credit are 
misleading. Although access to 
credit is an im portant aspect of the
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continued success o f the informal 
sector, economic evidence shows 
that subsidized credit has had disas­
trous consequences for Third 
World development. The major 
beneficiaries of subsidized credit 
have been public enterprises and 
the non-poor. In fact, subsidized 
credit has become a transfer pro­
gram for the non-poor while credit 
regulations and artificially low inter­
est rates have lent themselves to fur­
ther patronage and corruption. In 
T hird World subsidized credit pro­
grams, loans in arrears range from 
30% to 95%; in contrast, nonsub­
sidized loan programs have loan re­
covery rates exceeding 95%. What 
would be beneficial for the infor­
mal sector’s access to credit would 
be loan programs characterized by 
m arket rates, low transaction costs, 
greater borrower access to lenders, 
and some linkage between repay­
m ent and future lending.
The informal sector has encour­
aged risk-taking and enterprise in 
the T hird World regardless o f so­
cial class, enabling large num bers 
o f poor people to achieve subsis­
tence or better.
Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr.
International Consultant 
and Economic Adviser
Weston, Ontario, Canada
Researchers who conducted field­
work on urban poverty and the in­
formal economy in Latin America 
and elsewhere in the T hird World 
during the 1960s and ’70s should 
be interested to learn that their 
collective effort and findings fell 
short. Now, as Kempe Ronald
Hope tells us, “the exhaustive field 
research and a sound methodologi­
cal framework” used by H ernando 
De Soto and his followers have fi­
nally revealed the truth. Informal- 
sector activities that we had seen as 
an ingenious but frequently desper­
ate means of survival, turn out to 
be no less than the seed of future 
national development. While re­
searchers painstakingly traced the 
mechanisms through which large 
capitalist firms employ and exploit 
informal labor, they failed to note 
the fundam ental characteristic of 
the latter—that it is an engine of 
growth. But thanks to superior sta­
tistical abilities and ethnographic 
skills assembled by De Soto at his 
Institute for Liberty and Democ­
racy, the truth shines; street ven­
dors and shantytown sweatshop 
workers are really the entrepre­
neurs o f tomorrow, destined to 
move their countries out o f under­
development once the nefarious 
mercantilist state is taken out of 
the way.
H ope’s portrayal of events does 
no t stand up to the evidence. De 
Soto is a skillful politician and a 
brilliant ideological synthesizer, 
bu t he is no scholar. The effort to 
portray the spread o f the informal 
sector in Latin America as the 
m arch of progress has proven at­
tractive to some powerful circles,
which may explain why The Other 
Path is distributed by US consulates 
and embassies throughout the re­
gion. Nevertheless, this glowing 
portrait has little relation to the ac­
tual condition and prospects o f in­
formal entrepreneurs and their 
workers.
“De Soto’s prescription and 
m ine,” President George Bush 
declared, “is to . . .  unleash a mil­
lion sparks o f energy and enter­
prise; let the incentive of reward 
inspire m en and women to work 
better for themselves and their 
families.” Economist David Felix 
calls this “a particularly grotesque 
piece of P.R. gymnastics.” I will con­
tent myself with calling it another 
simplistic recipe to resolve the 
problem  o f underdevelopm ent 
that is destined, like its predeces­
sors, to bite the dust.
For a review of research evi­
dence on the ingenuity and crea­
tivity of the urban poor published 
ten to fifteen years before De 
Soto’s grand appearance, Hope 
may consult Alejandro Portes and 
John  Walton, Urban Latin America 
(University of Texas Press, 1976). 
For a review of recent research on 
the dynamics o f informal en ter­
prise both in advanced and less- 
developed countries, he may 
consult Alejandro Portes, Manuel 
Castells, and Lauren Benton (eds.),
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Letters to the Editor
The Informal Economy (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989).
The conclusion of the latter book 
provides the “alternative frame­
work” for policies toward the infor­
mal sector that H ope dem ands and 
that space prevented me from in­
cluding in the original com­
mentary.
Alejandro Portes 
D epartm ent o f Sociology 
The Johns Hopkins University
Advocating Violence?
Father Ed Cleary was so concerned 
to twist the knife in his review of 
my book Is Latin America Turning 
Protestant? (“Politicized Religion,” 
Hemisphere [Summer 1990]) that I 
should make two points. First, he 
may be right that too m uch space 
is devoted to the spectrum of US 
evangelists in Latin America. But I 
felt obliged to examine the issue be­
cause of indiscriminate broadsides 
against the “invasion of the sects” 
by Catholic bishops who have yet to 
be corrected by their in-house ex­
perts. If so many Catholic scholars 
had no t ignored evangelicals, I 
would no t have had to write the 
book, let alone establish the dif­
ference between the evangelical 
mission establishment and the 
religious right.
Second, contrary to Cleary, Is 
Latin America Turning Protestant? 
does no t echo the conservation 
canard that liberation theology is 
responsible for advocating vio­
lence. I do emphasize that, by 
asserting rights in repressive situa­
tions, consciousness-raising has 
often provoked m ore reprisals than 
Christians can defend themselves 
against. Most readers should be 
able to tell the difference between 
these two points.
David Stoll 
D epartm ent of Anthropology 
Stanford University
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SITTING IN THE EARTH AND LAUGHING
A HANDBOOK OF HUMOR 
A. Roy Eckardt
This book is at once a serious guide to humor and an entertain­
ing embodiment of humor itself. Designed to cross disciplinary 
boundaries, it directs itself to the sense and nonsense of humor 
in contemporary individual and social life.
ISBN: 1-56000-001-5 (cloth) 192pp. $29.95
ANTHROPOLOGICAL OTHER OR 
BURMESE BROTHER?
STUDIES IN CULTURAL ANALYSIS 
Mel ford Spiro
Classical anthropology has come under attack in recent years for 
its guiding belief in a common humanity between cultures as an 
expression of Western hegemonic discourse. This volume refutes 
these views and defends classical anthropology.
CELEBRATIONS
THE CULT OF ANNIVERSARIES IN EUROPE AND 
THE UNITED STATES TODAY
William M. Johnston
Every year hundreds of historical anniversaries attract media at­
tention and government investment in ever greater degrees. This 
insightful volume explores the causes and consequences of this 
major phenomenon of our time.
ISBN: 0^88738-375-0 (cloth) 196pp. $29.95
ENCOUNTER WITH ANTHROPOLOGY
SECOND EDITION 
Robin Fox
This volume is at once an introduction to anthropology, an ac­
count of a personal odyssey, and a call to rethink the discipline. 
After showing the range, potential, and weaknesses of anthropol- 
gy as a science, Fox outlines a new anthropology that will restore 
its original task of exploring human nature.
ISBN: 0-88738-870-1 (paper) 346pp. $19.95
THE INVENTED INDIAN
CULTURAL FICTIONS AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES
James A. Clifton, editor
This volume aims to reconstruct our understanding of the 
American Indian, past and present. It examines in careful, ac­
curate ways social myths about Indians and explores how these 
cultural fictions promote divisiveness and translate into policy. 
ISBN: 0-88738-341-6 (cloth) 300pp. $39.95
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Caribbean Development Options
by Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens
T he structural adjustm ent policies of the Interna­tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been widely criticized for im peding 
ra ther than prom oting develop­
m ent in the Caribbean during the 
last decade. For instance, such poli­
cies have drastically curtailed gov­
ernm ent expenditure on education 
and health. As a result, a portion of 
the region’s m eager resources 
m ust be channeled into the mere 
rehabilitation o f deteriorated physi­
cal infrastructure and hum an re­
sources, leaving little or nothing 
for programs that broaden the 
population’s access to education 
and health care. Likewise, struc­
tural adjustm ent policies no t only 
neglect small-scale local agricul­
ture—a significant source of em­
ployment and food—they also 
expose it to formidable interna­
tional and domestic competition 
from export-oriented agribusiness. 
Consequently, small-scale agricul­
ture has declined to the point that 
major investments are required just 
to achieve a modicum of recovery, 
a situation that com pounds the 
Caribbean’s problems of unemploy­
m ent and purchasing power.
Nonetheless, there is some de­
gree of optimism for the 1990s.
The end o f the Cold War may per­
mit the Caribbean to articulate an
Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens 
are professors of political science and 
sociology, and Faculty Fellows of the 
Center for Urban Affairs and Policy 
Research, at Northwestern University. 
They are co-authors (with Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer) o/Capitalist Devel­
opm ent and Democracy (Polity and 
University of Chicago Press, 1992).
alternative developm ent model 
that combines growth, equity, and 
democracy. Such an opportunity 
could extend to the reshaping of 
economic and political relations 
am ong Caribbean nations as well.
Crafting an alternative develop­
m ent m odel must begin by recog­
nizing two basic changes in the 
world economy. First, that the grow­
ing international mobility of capi­
tal and the related globalization of 
production greatly diminish op­
portunities for effective economic 
intervention by national states. Sec­
ond, that the formation of regional 
trade blocs is posing new chal­
lenges for the Caribbean, particu­
larly for those countries that are 
members of the Lome Convention.
On the positive side, these two 
changes indicate a potential for 
the expansion of intra-Caribbean 
trade. On the negative side, they 
expose the smaller countries to 
com petition from the larger coun­
tries for access to North American 
markets, and the Lome members 
to the loss of privileged access to 
European markets. This array of 
opportunities and obstacles means 
that skillful negotiation to prom ote 
cooperation am ong Caribbean 
countries and to shape their rela­
tions with the wider world will be 
essential to any successful develop­
m ent model for the 1990s.
The case of Jamaica illustrates 
these opportunities and obstacles. 
How might Jam aica’s policymakers 
maneuver in this setting? W hat are 
the implications for the Caribbean?
Past Models
Since 1970Jam aica has been eco­
nomically transformed. Its baux­
i te /  alum ina sector declined as a 
foreign-exchange earner relative to
tourism and export manufacturing. 
Local agriculture for the domestic 
m arket was first hu rt by im port 
deregulation and then devastated 
by a hurricane. This same hurri­
cane dam aged traditional export 
agriculture already suffering from 
declining terms of trade. Finally, 
local manufacturing for the domes­
tic m arket declined as a result of 
im port deregulation.
These shifts had serious con­
sequences for the comparative 
abilities of the public and private 
sectors to influence the country’s 
economic development. The rela­
tive decline of bauxite/alum ina as 
a foreign-exchange earner dim in­
ished the state’s economic weight 
in collecting revenues and allocat­
ing resources; the diversity and 
decentralization of the ascendant 
exchange earners, tourism and 
nontraditional exports, made them  
m ore appropriate for private-sector 
activity and, therefore, less am ena­
ble to state intervention. In addi­
tion, the interest-rate policies 
prescribed by the IMF have con­
centrated economic assets in the 
hands o f a few large groups based 
in financial services. These eco­
nomically powerful groups, now 
influential in domestic politics, 
have shown no inclination to invest 
outside the financial, commercial, 
and tourism sectors.
In this context, is it feasible for 
Jam aica to return  to the industrial- 
ization-by-invitation model it fol­
lowed in the 1950s and ’60s? Even 
overlooking the income inequality 
associated with this model, there 
are several reasons why it would fail 
in the 1990s. To begin with, indus­
trialization by invitation was driven 
by foreign investment in bauxite/ 
alum ina and tourism. Investment 
in these sectors, however, no
6  Hemisphere •  Fall 1991
longer approximates the magni­
tude needed to generate sustained 
economic growth. Even assuming 
the availability o f sufficient foreign 
capital, past experience shows that 
foreign investment in the minerals 
and tourism sectors did no t estab­
lish adequate linkages with the 
rem ainder o f the economy. More­
over, generalized protection of do­
mestic industry—which was a vital 
aspect o f industrialization by invita­
tion—im peded economic develop­
m ent in the long run throughout 
the Caribbean and Latin America, 
mainly by shielding inefficient 
local producers from competition.
Is it feasible, then, for Jamaica 
to return  to President Michael 
Manley’s democratic socialist path 
o f the 1970s? That path, which, 
practically speaking, stressed eco­
nomic redistribution to the detri­
m ent of investment, requires state 
access to a large new inflow of re­
sources from export earnings. Such 
access is also required for a more 
investment-oriented state-led devel­
opm ent model. Yet no such access 
is on the horizon for the foresee­
able future. Sources for foreign 
borrowing will be scarce as well, 
particularly for a democratic-social- 
ist government, which could not 
afford the unpopular policies asso­
ciated with IMF conditionality. The 
Jam aican state, therefore, would be 
unable to assume direct com m and 
of the economy outside its already 
established participation in the 
bauxite/alum ina industry. Rather, 
its role would be one o f economic 
regulation. This role, however, 
dem ands an efficient state appara­
tus, the lack of which was a key rea­
son for the failure of Jam aica’s 
democratic socialism in the 1970s. 
As a result o f the drastic deteriora­
tion of public-sector salaries in the
1980s, the managerial weakness of 
the state is even worse today.
A nother departure from the 
model of the 1970s, as well as from 
that of the 1950s and ’60s, would 
have to be the use of m ore selec­
tive im port controls. In the long 
term, protection would have to be 
aim ed at developing low import- 
content, domestically oriented in­
dustries with a chance of becoming
Indiscriminate state 
shrinking would 
jeopardize previous 
economic development 
in key sectors.
competitive internationally. For 
example, given the small size o f its 
hom e market, Jamaica might want 
to protect the m anufacturing o f fur­
niture but no t refrigerators. Still an­
other departure from the model of 
the 1970s would have to be success­
ful attempts to obtain higher and 
m ore stable prices for raw material 
exports through agreem ents with 
o ther T hird World producers. 
Jam aica would also have to find 
niches for its nontraditional 
exports and to negotiate special 
trade relations with regional mar­
ket blocs.
Though Jam aican president 
Edward Seaga in the 1980s pro­
claimed his adherence to a neo­
liberal model, he in fact pursued 
policies that were m uch closer to a 
state-capitalist model, with the im­
portant exception of trade deregu­
lation. W ould such a state-capitalist 
model be the most viable one in 
the 1990s, particularly since the 
economic conditions of this de­
cade will be similar to those of the 
preceding decade? The state-capi­
talist m odel could generate eco­
nomic growth if it recognized the 
necessity o f a smaller state-owned 
economic sector, m ore efficient 
state apparatus, and m ore (though 
selective) protection. A major prob­
lem, however, would likely appear 
in the area o f political strategy.
Due to its negative consequences 
for the distribution of wealth and 
income, the model of the 1980s 
would require substantial govern­
m ent expenditures on patronage— 
by definition, unproductive—in 
o rder to maintain a base o f popu­
lar support. Complicating this p ro b  
lem is the certainty that, in the 
post-Cold War setting, no Carib­
bean regime could count on a spe­
cial relationship with the US like 
that of Jam aica’s in the 1980s. Re­
gimes pursuing a state-interven- 
tionist path, even a state-capitalist 
one, would be particularly disadvan­
taged in their relations with the US.
The Neoliberal Model
Given that IMF policies currently 
hold sway, an obvious question is 
whether a pure neoliberal model 
would work in the 1990s. A basic 
problem  with this model stems 
from the fact that the Jamaican 
state was quite effective in areas 
such as the bauxite/alum ina indus­
try, banking, and im porting es­
sential goods. Consequently, 
indiscriminate state shrinking 
would jeopardize economic devel­
opm ent. An unregulated private 
sector was apparently successful in 
tourism and export-platform m anu­
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facturing, bu t appearances are de­
ceptive. The state has conducted 
tourism m arketing in both the US 
and Europe through the Jam aica 
Tourist Board; and in the early 
1980s Jam aican president Seaga 
and US president Ronald Reagan 
did the im portant complementary 
work o f m anagingjam aica’s inter­
national political image. Mean­
while the political negotiation of 
special access to the US garm ent 
m arket was crucial to the growth of 
Jam aica’s export platforms, as like­
wise were the devaluations that 
greatly cheapened the cost of 
Jam aican labor.
In any case, if the essence of 
economic developm ent is the im­
provem ent of living standards by in­
creasing labor’s productivity, then 
a model based on thie degradation 
of living standards by cheapening 
labor cannot be effective. At the 
least, im plem enting such a model 
in Jam aica would leave the coun­
try’s export platforms vulnerable to 
com petition from lower-wage coun­
tries in the Caribbean and else­
where.
The strongest argum ent against 
a pure neoliberal model is the lack 
of any historical precedent. No 
small, export-oriented economy 
has ever become a successful late 
developer by following this path. 
This fact is clear with respect to the 
economic developm ent of both 
small European countries and the 
“Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan). In 
both instances economic develop­
m ent revolved around the rela­
tively equitable distribution of 
wealth in the primary sector and 
state protection o f infant indus­
tries, as well as a wider range of 
state regulatory and en trepreneur­
ial activities. To argue that Carib­
bean recovery and developm ent 
can be accomplished through a 
neoliberal m odel with indiscrimi­
nate tariff reduction, deregulation, 
and state shrinking is to completely 
misread the comparative evidence.
Even if correctly read, however, 
the experiences of the Asian Tigers 
could not be replicated by Carib­
bean countries for two reasons. 
First, the post-World War II strate­
gic im portance of South Korea and 
Taiwan provided them  with mas­
sive US aid, which their states chan­
neled into dynamic economic 
sectors. Second, as a study by Wil­
liam R. Cline shows, if all Third 
World countries reached the ex­
port density o f the Asian Tigers, 
their m anufactured exports would 
rapidly confront protectionist re­
sponses in the developed world. As 
a result, 80% of such exports would 
face problems of m arket access.
Toward an Alternative Model
W hat conclusions can be drawn 
for Caribbean developm ent in the 
1990s? Arguably a development 
m odel for the Caribbean should 
concentrate on state intervention 
in the following spheres: prom ot­
ing special export markets; guiding 
investment into areas with high ex­
port potential; establishing link­
ages between agricultural and 
industrial developm ent in both 
the use of local resources and the 
creation of a domestic market; and 
improving hum an resources.
Within this framework, the state 
should carry out land reform  to cre­
ate efficient family farmers, agri­
cultural service, and marketing 
cooperatives. Moreover the state 
should selectively protect domestic 
industry and should prom ote free 
trade with countries o f roughly 
equal development. The latter 
implies strong efforts to establish 
regional integration. The state 
should encourage foreign invest­
m ent where it will contribute to for- 
eign-exchange earnings or savings 
and where domestic resources are 
insufficient. The issue o f distribu­
tion should be addressed through 
state support for small enterprises, 
both individual and collective, and 
through improved public health 
and education programs, which are 
essential to the developm ent of a 
skilled labor force.
The preceding is no t a naive 
wish list. It does no t include in­
creased governm ent spending on
social welfare or public-sector job  
creation, simply because the re­
sources for such undertakings are 
unavailable in the 1990s. It concep­
tualizes redistribution no t in terms 
of governm ent spending on con­
sumption, but in terms o f produc­
tive assets and access to health care 
and education.
In this setting, a political strate­
gy based on populist appeals would 
be counterproductive; either the 
promises could not be fulfilled or 
the developm ent policies would be 
derailed. W hat is required is pains­
taking political organization, along 
with political education regarding 
developm ent opportunities and ob­
stacles. This approach is necessary 
to forestall no t only the political as­
cendance o f opportunistic popu­
lists whose irresponsible policies 
could thwart developm ent efforts, 
bu t also the political alienation of 
the rank-and-file population dur­
ing economically difficult times.
Political organization and educa­
tion should be directed at forging a 
coalition between the middle and 
lower classes in support of this de­
velopm ent model, as well as at fos­
tering an accom m odation with the 
capitalist class. To be sure, pro­
grams such as land reform  could 
jeopardize such an accommoda­
tion, depending on the socioeco­
nomic structure of the particular 
country. It is thus crucial that land 
reform  and related programs not 
be orchestrated as general attacks 
on private property, and that invest­
m ent opportunities be created in 
other sectors o f the economy.
This developm ent m odel and 
political strategy could be catego­
rized as social dem ocratic or a m od­
erate form o f democratic socialism. 
It may seem a pale shadow o f the 
developm ent vision pursued in 
Jam aica in the 1970s or o f dem o­
cratic-socialist ideals in the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, in light o f its corre­
spondence to the successful m od­
els o f small late developers and its 
consequences for Caribbean living 
standards, the approach is more 
promising than that o f the neo­
liberals. ■
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Commentary
Women in Public O ffice
by Kathleen Logan
O
n February 14,1991, 
Dulce Maria Sauri 
Riancho de Sierra took 
office as the first woman 
governor of Yucatan, 
Mexico. In so doing 
she jo ined  C. P. Ana Rosa Payan 
Cervera, the first woman mayor of 
Merida, and Ligia Cortez Ortega, 
the first woman chief justice of the 
state supreme court, to form a tri­
umvirate o f women in the key state 
offices of Yucatan. The presence of 
women at the center of political 
power is no t unique to Yucatan, 
bu t indicates a Latin American and 
Caribbean trend  of increased fe­
male participation in public life.
Since the mid-1970s women 
have begun to be elected to the 
highest offices of Latin American 
and Caribbean nations. Lidia 
Geiler o f Bolivia (1979) andV io- 
leta Cham orro of Nicaragua (1990) 
were elected presidents; Eugenia 
Charles of Dominica (1980) and 
Maria Liberia Peters o f the N ether­
lands Antilles (1988) were elected 
prim e ministers. (Neither Isabel 
Peron of Argentina [1974] nor 
Ertha Pascal Trouillot of Haiti 
[1990] was elected to the presidency 
of her country.) And with the an­
nouncem ent of her presidential 
candidacy, Margarita Penon de 
Arias of Costa Rica becomes the 
most recent Latin American 
woman to seek her country’s top 
governmental position.
Kathleen Logan is associate professor of 
anthropology at Florida International 
University and H em isphere’s book re­
view editor. Her current research project 
is En las Calles: W om en’s Collec­
tive Organizing in Merida, Yucatan, 
Mexico.
In addition to these high-profile 
successes, Latin American and 
Caribbean women have won other 
im portant national offices in grad­
ually increasing numbers. Between 
1975 and 1987 the growing num ­
ber of women in the region’s parlia­
m ents raised the female portion of 
national legislatures from 5% to 
8%. In Dominica women hold 
m ore than 20% of the ministerial 
level positions—a percentage 
equaled or surpassed by only two 
other nations worldwide, Bhutan 
and Norway.
The growing number 
of women in public 
office does not easily 
translate into broader 
gains for Latin 
American and 
Caribbean women.
Latin American and Caribbean 
women also have a growing pres­
ence in local public offices and in 
public-sector service jobs. Women 
such as Luiza Erundina and Pas- 
cuala Rosado have been elected 
mayors in such markedly different 
cities as Sao Paulo, Brazil, and 
Huaycan, Peru. In the region as a 
whole, an average of 20% of state 
administrators and managers are 
women, the highest levels being 
those o f Argentina (28%) and 
Mexico (24%).
The entrance o f women into 
public life via the ballot box and 
public-sector em ployment comple­
ments the well-known grassroots po­
litical activism of Latin American 
and Caribbean women. Since the 
1960s many women, especially 
those from low-income groups, 
have participated in the region’s 
community, religious, ecological, 
peace, hum an rights, and trade 
union movements. -
Grassroots Spin-Offs?
The growing num ber o f women in 
public office, however, does no t eas­
ily translate into broader gains for 
women. For a variety of reasons, ad­
vances for women are likely to be 
incremental, built upon wom en’s 
traditional caretaker roles or 
linked to efforts to improve condi­
tions for citizens in general.
Since public officials of either 
gender are elected by female as 
well as male voters, they are likely 
to focus on issues that mark the 
lives o f women and m en alike, such 
as poverty and sectarian violence. 
The issues that primarily affect 
women, such as abortion, rape, 
pornography, family violence, gen­
der discrimination, and exploita­
tion of domestic workers, will likely 
continue to m erit less attention 
from both female and male of­
ficials.
The problems that female and 
male politicians must confront-—  
especially regarding the crises of 
their national economies—are so 
compelling that the issues that 
principally affect women occupy 
secondary status. With limited re­
sources to com bat grave national 
problems, politicians must set prior­
ities that often leave wom en’s is­
sues unresolved.
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Changes for the better in the 
lives of Latin American and Carib­
bean women will come when m ore 
general conditions in the region 
improve. Economic reactivation, 
the end of political violence, and 
advances in education, health, and 
public services will incrementally 
help women.
The success of efforts to im­
prove the conditions of life for 
women per se requires that female 
political leaders ally themselves 
with female grassroots activists. Suc­
cess in forming alliances with such 
women will depend upon the 
leaders’ ability to capitalize on the 
issues that most concern women at 
the grassroots. Many o f the con­
cerns o f these women grow out of 
their traditional roles as family and 
community caretakers. Thus, issues 
such as employment, education, 
health care, and public services are 
obvious rallying points for such an 
alliance. Since women at the grass­
roots have taken a special interest 
in ecology and hum an rights, at­
tention to these issues will also en­
able female politicians to broaden 
their support am ong women. If alli­
ances are form ed between women 
politicians and women grassroots 
activists, they could begin to con­
front those problems that almost 
exclusively affect women.
In no case, however, will prob­
lems such as family violence, rape, 
pornography, abortion, gender 
discrimination, and the exploita­
tion of domestic workers be easily 
resolved. For example, the ques­
tion o f abortion rights will provoke 
the opposition of the Roman Cath­
olic Church, and that o f pornogra­
phy will provoke debate about 
censorship. The m atter o f  rights 
for domestic workers will divide 
women by economic interests, 
while that of gender discrimina­
tion will strike at the core o f socie­
tal role definitions for women and 
men.
In forming alliances with grass­
roots activists, women politicians 
are likely to be least successful if
they organize under the banner of 
feminism. In Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the term  “femi­
nism” is m ore controversial than 
in N orth America and W estern Eu­
rope. Although feminism is losing 
its connotation as a North Ameri­
can im port of dubious value—and 
its long history as a home-grown 
movement is gaining recognition— 
to be labeled a “feminist” is still a 
political handicap.
In addition to the promise of 
alliances between women politi­
cians and women grassroots activ­
ists, the election of women to 
public office promises o ther 
long-term gains for women. The 
prom inence o f female politicians 
creates new, socially accepted roles 
for women and provides role m od­
els for future generations o f fe­
males. In the long run  the growing 
presence o f women in public life 
will help to redefine the Latin 
American and Caribbean gender 
description of power and influ­
ence. ■
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Chile: The Perfect Transition?
by Pamela Constable
A fter 18 m onths of civil­ian rule, Chile’s smooth return  to democracy from dictatorship is being widely hailed as the “perfect transition.” 
Bloodless and legally neat, the tran­
sition period has been marked by 
an obsession with avoiding confron­
tation and reestablishing a sense of 
normalcy after two decades of 
traum a and conflict.
Halfjokingly, pundits are start­
ing to complain that Chile has be­
come boring. A capital where cafes 
once flowed with wine and debate 
until dawn has been reborn, 17 
years later, as a businesslike hub of 
consum er culture and pragmatic 
politics. Every divisive issue is 
sm oothed over or watered down 
in endless negotiations. “Is there 
no room  left for dreams, illusions 
and utopias?” worries Jose Joaquin 
Bruner, a leading sociologist, in a 
recent essay.
The government, a center-left 
coalition headed by Christian Dem­
ocrat Patricio Aylwin, has adopted 
a m odest agenda and compromis­
ing style, aimed largely at appeas­
ing its right-wing opposition in the 
legislature and the arm ed forces. 
Economic officials, once bitter 
critics of the free-market model 
imposed by the form er military re­
gime, have swallowed their pride 
and adopted the m odel nearly 
wholesale, keeping Chile’s growth 
and inflation rates am ong the 
healthiest in the continent.
Pamela Constable is the Latin America 
correspondent for the Boston Globe. 
She is co-author (with Arturo Valen­
zuela) of A  Nation of Enemies: 
Chile under Pinochet (W. W. Nor­
ton, 1991).
Even General Augusto Pinochet, 
the dictator who once earned 
worldwide pariah-hood as he pre­
sided over a ruthless police state, is 
being gradually rehabilitated. “We 
have to give him credit for his eco­
nomic success, and for behaving 
well in a new institutional situation. 
As he becomes less worrisome, peo­
ple are judging him more mag­
nanimously,” com m ented Eugenio 
Tironi, a governm ent spokesman 
and sociologist who once wrote 
books that detailed social injustice 
under Pinochet.
Abroad, the whitewashing of 
Chile’s recent history has been 
m ore blatant. In international fi­
nance circles, P inochet’s record of 
foreign-debt repaym ent and privati­
zation were far better known—and 
m ore relevant—than his record of 
torture and prisoner disappear­
ances. Now that o ther Latin Ameri­
can democracies are scrambling to 
copy Chile’s formula for economic 
revitalization, the darker side of its 
dictatorship is being conveniently 
forgotten.
In a column in the Washington 
Post (August 23,1991), Michael 
Schrage even suggests that the 
fumbling coup-plotters in Moscow 
could have “gotten some pragmatic 
advice from a despot who really 
knew how to run a coup”—General 
Pinochet. “The ruthlessly efficient 
pragmatism of the Pinochet model 
may ultimately prove m ore appeal­
ing than the still-elusive promises 
of glasnost and perestroikahe adds.
Cynical Counsel
Conservative Chileans m ight agree, 
but to others such cynical counsel 
would be a slap in the face. They 
include the hundreds o f thousands 
who lost their livelihood and
dignity during the labor purges 
that accompanied P inochet’s eco­
nomic “shock treatm ent”; the 
tens of thousands who were im­
prisoned, tortured, or forced into 
exile after the 1973 military coup; 
and the families o f at least 700 pris­
oners who vanished in military 
custody.
The governm ent’s response to 
the volatile issue o f hum an rights 
has been rhetorically bold but 
legally timid. In March 1991 a blue- 
ribbon official commission pro­
duced a harrowing report that 
describes a systematic terror cam­
paign by Pinochet’s secret police 
and details m ore than 2,000 m ur­
ders at their hands. Aylwin pre­
sented the report with an 
impassioned appeal for justice, 
and about 210 o f the cases were 
forwarded to the courts. But most 
cannot be prosecuted because of a 
1978 amnesty law, and hum an 
rights lawyers expect the others to 
be overturned by higher courts, 
still dom inated by Pinochet-era 
appointees.
The one likely case with any 
chance o f success stems from the
1976 car-bomb assassination of 
O rlando Letelier, a form er foreign 
minister under Marxist president 
Salvador Allende. H alf a dozen 
m en have been convicted in the 
killing, bu t Chile’s supreme court 
refused to try or extradite the intel­
ligence officials who allegedly or­
dered it. In August 1991 a Cuban 
exile from Florida confessed to 
being the trigger man, and a new 
high court justice ordered the case 
reopened. Still, many Chileans 
doubt the governm ent will pursue 
the case to its full consequences 
and challenge P inochet’s formida­
ble form er secret police chief, 
General Manuel Contreras.
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On the whole, hum an rights 
seem to have degenerated from a 
noble cause to a political head­
ache—another “bargaining chip” 
for the executive to use in its deli­
cate power-balancing act with the 
conservative establishment. Despite 
his personal compassion, Aylwin’s 
clear priority is political peace, and 
so far he has not been willing to 
risk a serious attack on either the 
civilian or military right.
To a large extent, Aylwin’s 
hands are tied—both by the num er­
ous authoritarian laws enacted by 
the form er regime, and by the fact 
that Pinochet, who stepped down 
as president in March 1990, re­
mains com m ander o f a large, 
m odern army that he has sworn to 
protect from civilian “interfer­
ence.” U nder the 1980 constitu­
tion, the 76-year-old general can 
remain in this position for another 
six years.
By many accounts, Chile’s mili­
tary establishment remains ex­
tremely suspicious of civilian 
authorities. Formal relations are 
correct, and the few times Pinochet 
has attem pted to overstep the 
bounds o f military authority, Ayl­
win has firmly resisted. But under­
neath, many officers are angry at 
civilian attempts to control the 
arm ed forces and defiant over 
abuses com m itted in the nam e of a 
patriotic, anticom m unist mission.
“There is a fundam ental mis­
trust,” says Cristian Labbe, a retired 
colonel and form er close aide to 
Pinochet. “The government 
doesn’t understand us military 
men. W hen they try to push us 
around it has the opposite effect. 
W hen one o f us is attacked or in­
sulted, we all feel attacked.”
The governm ent’s attem pt to 
redress military abuses has also
been underm ined by an epidemic 
of crime, several prison escapes, 
and a num ber o f terrorist killings 
blam ed on ultra-leftist groups. The 
April 1,1991, slaying o f Jaime 
Guzman, Chile’s leading conserva­
tive senator, shocked the nation 
and forced the government, which 
had freed a num ber of leftist pris­
oners early on, to step up anti­
terrorist tactics.
Human rights seem 
to have degenerated 
from a noble cause to 
a political headache— 
another “bargaining 
chip” against 
the conservative 
establishment.
The progressive ruling coalition 
is further ham strung by the re­
strictive political laws put in place 
before P inochet’s departure. One- 
fourth of the senate was appointed 
under military rule, as were almost 
all o f Chile’s 300 mayors, and 
electoral regulations were skewed 
to favor conservative districts and 
tickets. Rightist legislators can effec­
tively veto any governm ent pro­
posal, requiring its supporters to 
constantly engage in deal-making. 
As one frustrated congressman 
said, Chile has become a “democ­
racy of forced accords.”
For its part, the public has 
shown far m ore concern about 
concrete economic and social prob­
lems than abstract issues o f justice. 
Despite five years o f steady eco­
nomic growth, about one-third of 
the populace remains below the 
poverty level, and desperation has 
coincided with the end of a repres­
sive police state to produce a verita­
ble boom  in thievery. In a recent 
survey, 16% of Santiago residents 
said their homes had been bur­
glarized.
Setting a New Agenda
While Chilean officials congratu­
late themselves on achieving the 
near-perfect transition, critics say 
the government is failing to con­
front these and a host o f o ther 
problems, such as the need for con­
stitutional and judicial reform, the 
so-called “social deb t” to those who 
suffered economically under 
Pinochet, and the necessity o f re­
ducing the size and autonomy of 
the military establishment.
By defining itself as a transition 
governm ent and stressing the need 
for consensus above all else, Ayl- 
win’s adm inistration may have for­
feited a unique opportunity to 
make changes essential to consoli­
dating democracy. Aylwin, though 
a figure of impeccable moral au­
thority, has cast his presidency in a 
deliberately limited role, refusing 
suggestions to extend his four-year 
term and leaving most divisive is­
sues for his successor.
As critics see it, Chile’s transi­
tion is already safely past, and its 
leaders must start acting with m ore 
boldness and vision. “A govern­
m ent that inaugurates a regime 
cannot avoid being foundational,” 
writes social scientist Manuel Anto­
nio G arreton in a recent essay.
‘T his is no t an abstract debate. 
Pragmatism and minimalism are 
no t ju st strategies—they are ideo­
logical options.” ■
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Bolivia: The
by Raul Barrios Moron
sychological operations” 
are an integral part of so- 
called low-intensity war- 
fare. By means o f such 
operations a cam paign’s 
organizers direct persua­
sive messages at target sectors o f a 
population, according to the loca­
tion and the im portance of those 
sectors in an actual or potential 
conflict. In light of the campaign’s 
political goals, the purpose o f psy­
chological operations is to modify 
the attitudes, beliefs, and emotions 
o f a target audience by manipulat­
ing images, symbols, and infor­
mation.
In theory, psychological opera­
tions motivate allies, demoralize 
the enemy, and mobilize the sup­
port o f neutral parties. Against the 
stark backdrop of military technol­
ogy and tactics, they are geared to 
winning hearts and minds. Indeed, 
the priority of low-intensity warfare 
is to sow the political seeds of vic­
tory before setting foot onto the 
military field of battle.
In the 1990s the US government 
has defined the coca-producing re­
gions of Bolivia as fertile terrain for 
low-intensity warfare. The strategic 
objectives of the Bush administra­
tion coincide with its post-Cold 
War definition o f the Andean re­
gion as a hem ispheric security 
zone, owing mainly to the illegal 
trafficking of cocaine.
Raul Barrios Moron is a researcher at 
the Facultad Latinoamericana de Cien- 
cias Sociales (FLACSO), in Bolivia. He 
is the author o/’Bolivia y Estados Uni- 
dos: Democracia, Derechos Huma- 
nos y Narcotrafico (1980-1982) (La 
Paz: Hisbol-FLACSO, 1989).
Psychology of Drug War
Coca-Producing Regions
Bolivia as War Zone
With the US governm ent’s finan­
cial support and technical backing, 
the Bolivian army recently began 
psychological warfare operations to 
com bat cocaine production as well 
as associated terrorism and subver­
sion. Army com m anders are par­
ticularly concerned about two 
issues: the presence of Colombian 
drug traffickers in Bolivia’s zones 
of coca-paste production and com­
merce, and the possible incursion 
by P eru’s Sendero Luminoso into 
Bolivia’s border areas. They regard 
these as “nonconventional” ex­
ternal threats that justify the 
strengthening o f the military es­
tablishment. So, evidently, does 
the Bush administration, which 
boosted US military assistance to 
Bolivia from $5.8 million in 1989 to 
$40.7 million in 1991.
This political climate represents 
a crucial opportunity for the Boliv-
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ian army to recoup its form er au­
thority in matters o f internal secu­
rity, which has deteriorated since 
the transition to democracy began 
in 1982. Contributing to the 
military’s renewed sense of mission 
and indispensability has been the 
institutional breakdown o f the po­
lice, caused by widespread drug- 
related corruption.
As a reflection of the new mili­
tary outlook, the Bolivian army 
established in 1990 what it calls 
Departamento III de Operaciones Psico- 
logicas. Departamento ///form ulates 
strategy for combating drug traffick­
ing, which it identifies as “the prin­
cipal threat to Bolivia’s national 
security.” The formal context of
this strategy was the signing, on 
May 7, 1990, of Annex III to the 
1987 US-Bolivian bilateral antidrug 
agreem ent, under which President 
Jaim e Paz Zamora agreed to order 
the Bolivian army into the war on 
drugs. The new role of psychologi­
cal operations is thus to create a 
social climate that paves the way 
for the inevitable entry of military 
units into the vast theater o f coun­
terdrug operations. What, however, 
are the implications of this strategy 
for civil-military relations in the 
setting of Bolivia’s efforts at 
democratization?
Relevant to this question are two 
objectives of “drug war” psychologi­
cal operations. First, they replace
the police with the military, there­
by militarizing Bolivia’s task of 
m aintaining internal security. Sec­
ond, in so doing they redefine the 
nation’s territory as a war zone, 
thereby imposing tight restrictions 
on the expression o f public opin­
ion. In the latter respect, the 
strategy constructs dichotom ous 
categories of reference—for exam­
ple, that either you support the 
militarization o f counterdrug oper­
ations or you support the drug traf­
fickers.
The political construction of 
such dichotomies is tantam ount to 
discrediting the critics o f the milita­
rization program . Thus authorities 
explained the protest marches by
Military drug-war poster
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campesinos in mid-1991 as the prod­
uct o f a conspiracy by intransigent 
union leaders, opposition parties 
and nongovernm ental organiza­
tions, and drug traffickers. The 
official rhetoric of polarization im- 
plicidy defines the military’s anti­
drug role as essential to Bolivia’s 
national security. The underlying 
message is that only the military 
can guarantee the nation’s survival 
against the drug trade’s subversive 
impact. In this respect, psychologi­
cal operations seek to impose, 
ra ther than negotiate, political 
consensus.
The Paz Zamora administration 
is evasive when asked how Bolivia’s 
tenuous democracy could possibly 
survive the escalation of social con­
flict that is likely to occur—above 
all in rural zones—if the military 
assumes the police’s role o f main­
taining domestic security. The key 
question is whether the country’s 
political parties, social groups, exec­
utive branch, and congress will 
prove capable of tightening the 
reins on the military.
Propagandizing the Countryside
A few o f Bolivia’s coca-producing 
regions, such as Chulumani in the 
Yungas Valley of La Paz, have been 
blanketed by the propaganda of 
psychological operations. Part of 
these operations is the dissemi­
nation of a poster titled “Por un 
m anana m ejor” (“For a Better To­
morrow”). The poster’s graphic 
content depicts two antagonistic 
worlds. O n the one side lies a fu­
ture o f peace, prosperity, patriot­
ism, and tradition represented by 
an unarm ed soldier smiling at a 
hopeful campesino couple. O n the 
o ther side lies the apparent alter­
native: the darkness, disorder, and 
alien ways o f the present. The orga­
nization responsible for the poster 
is not indicated, undoubtedly a re­
flection o f the army’s lack o f credi­
bility am ong campesinos.
The poster conveys an unequiv­
ocal understanding of the mili­
tary’s self-appointed role. An 
unarm ed soldier occupies center
stage, in a tutelary, paternalistic, 
and trustworthy spirit, pointing the 
way for a respectful campesino man 
and woman. He guides them  away 
from a netherworld o f evil and self- 
destruction and toward a m odern­
izing rural life whose bedrock 
values are Catholic and patriotic. 
Illum inated by a radiant sun, the fu­
ture setting revolves around a man 
and tractor at work in a field, sur­
rounded  by a bridge, modern-style 
campesino houses, a church, and 
the Bolivian flag. The latter gener­
ously displays the national b anner’s 
colors of red, yellow, and green, 
thus extending a sense o f citizen­
ship to the countryside. In spite of 
the Catholic C hurch’s strong anti­
militarization voice, the poster 
portrays the Church as giving its 
blessing to the army’s antidrug war. 
No less im portant, the poster as­
serts the Bolivian—as opposed to 
US—origins of the antidrug cam­
paign.
This attem pt at symbolic fusion 
between Bolivia’s arm ed forces and 
campesinos is rem iniscent of the 
military-campesino pact o f 1961-74, 
which sustained the period’s au­
thoritarian governments. Hence 
the poster reflects an attem pt to 
resurrect an old anticom m unist 
alliance in a new political setting.
In so doing the arm ed forces are 
following a strategy o f psychologi­
cal operations to m anipulate the 
vulnerabilities of the target audi-
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ence. Against a backdrop of ex­
trem e rural poverty, Bolivian coca 
producers face a dual economic vul­
nerability: the price instability of 
the coca/cocaine m arket and their 
lack o f production competitive­
ness. To many campesinos—who, 
after all, tu rned  to coca production 
in the first place because of the 
absence o f viable economic alterna­
tives—the military’s rural develop­
m ent programs may appear to be 
the only guarantee o f economic 
survival and progress.
Development programs, as sym­
bolized by the tractor and bridge 
in the poster, are certainly no t new 
to military campaigns in the Boliv­
ian countryside. W hat the poster 
warns, however, is that Bolivia’s 
current rural developm ent p ro­
gram, Desarrollo Altemativo, seems 
to have become a m ere comple­
m ent for an incipient campaign of 
low-intensity warfare. The points of 
reference for this campaign are the 
Andean nexus with post-Cold War 
geopolitics and the perm anence of 
extrem e poverty in Bolivia. In real­
ity, it is no t drug trafficking but 
ra ther the com bination of Bolivia’s 
extrem e poverty and the strategic 
impositions of the US drug war 
that pose the principal threat to 
Bolivian national security and the 
consolidation o f democracy. ■
(Translated by Hem isphere staff)
New Publication
The Changing Hemispheric Trade Environment: 
Opportunities and Obstacles
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
Prominent scholars and policymakers analyze options for hemispheric trade, including the 
likely impact of a North American free trade agreement and a single European market and 
the roles of Japan and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
165 pp. $11.95 (paperback)
Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, 
University Park, Miami, Florida 33199; (305) 348-2894; Fax (305) 348-3593.
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Mexico: Free Trade and Ecology
by Jan Gilbreath Rich
i
ree-trade negotiations 
have spurred a transfor-
r
mation in Mexico’s Secre- 
taria de Desarrollo Urbanoy 
Ecologia (SEDUE), which 
has been frequently criti­
cized both in Mexico and abroad 
for its inability to m onitor indus­
trial pollution.
As concerns have surfaced both 
in Mexico and in the US Congress 
over the environm ental impact o f a 
N orth American free-trade agree­
m ent, SEDUE officials have begun 
to revamp their environmental 
programs and look for new inter­
national funds to finance them. At 
the same time, SEDUE began what 
may be the agency’s most signif­
icant crackdown on industrial 
polluters.
SEDUE officials deny that their 
abrupt improvements emanate 
from the US public debate over the 
possibility of worsening industrial 
pollution under a free-trade agree­
ment, bu t they acknowledge that 
their sometimes-beleaguered 
agency is experiencing a m etam or­
phosis. Sergio Reyes Lujan, SEDUE 
undersecretary for environmental 
programs, says, “We have every in­
tention to change our situation 
and the political will to do so.”
Over the past few months, 
SEDUE officials have m et every 
week with their US counterparts in 
the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to form an environ­
m ental m anagem ent plan for the 
2,000-mile US-Mexican border.
Jan Gilbreath Rich is an environmental 
policy specialist at the Lyndon Baines 
Johnson School of Public Affairs, Uni­
versity of Texas at Austin. Her publica­
tions include “Bordering on Trouble, ” 
Environmental Forum (1991).
They have significantly increased 
their pollution-m onitoring person­
nel, closed 350 industries over a 
three-m onth period for pollution 
violations, and have finalized an 
agreem ent with the World Bank to 
provide $100 million for new 
SEDUE financing.
Mexican officials deny 
that the abrupt 
improvements stem 
from US debate over 
the possibility of 
worsened pollution 
under a free-trade 
agreement.
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These changes, however, do not 
make SEDUE a m odern, effective 
agency. The new personnel, for ex­
ample, will enhance what has only 
been a token gesture in pollution 
control. Until m ore than 50 new 
pollution inspectors were added to 
its staff in 1991, SEDUE had less 
than a dozen inspectors for border 
industries in the four-state area 
bordering Texas.
Moreover, SEDUE’s budget 
remains small by EPA standards.
In 1990 the agency only had about 
$3.15 million for all pollution con­
trol programs in Mexico. Such 
funding represents a m ere fraction 
of a single US state agency budget 
for pollution control. But the new 
World Bank funds, o ther loans
SEDUE is seeking, and the new 
personnel indicate that SEDUE is 
going to get tough with both do­
mestic and foreign industries in 
Mexico, Reyes Lujan says. “If some 
industry goes in the wrong direc­
tion, we are going to close it,” 
he claims.
Skepticism
Reyes Lujan’s promises m eet with 
skepticism, however, from Mexico’s 
environm ental community. “Plant 
closings tapered down dramatically 
after the US Congress approved 
fast-track procedures,” says Betty 
Ferber de Aridjis, spokeswoman for 
the Group of 100, one of Mexico’s 
most prom inent environmental 
groups. “There is still a woefully in­
adequate budget and there are still 
no t enough [plant] inspections.”
Environmentalists are equally 
concerned with their inability to ob­
tain inform ation on SEDUE’s 
plans. The lack o f a right-to-know 
law in Mexico allows the agency to 
operate in relative secrecy, com­
plains Aridjis. “It makes it difficult 
to get accurate inform ation or, 
sometimes, any inform ation,” she 
says.
EPA officials, however, are de­
lighted at the changes in SEDUE. 
The agency’s transformation is 
m entioned frequently by US offi­
cials touting the long-awaited reso­
lution of border environmental 
issues. In the same spirit o f cooper­
ation, the US governm ent has 
begun to make new offers o f tech­
nical assistance to SEDUE and to 
offer some new funding, although 
no loans or grants have been forth­
coming. The EPA recently agreed 
to give SEDUE about $150,000 for 
a program  on greenhouse gases, 
for example, bu t has yet to pro-
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duce funds to help SEDUE carry 
out the jo in t border m anagem ent 
plan—now in its fifth draft.
Initiative of Its Own
SEDUE is showing initiative o f its 
own, however, by negotiating for a 
loan o f $165,000 to shore up 
agency infrastructure. At the same 
time, it is forcing domestic and for­
eign industries to sign new agree­
m ents limiting toxic air and water 
emissions in compliance with tech­
nical regulations unfolding under 
Mexico’s omnibus environmental 
act of 1988. Such agreem ents are a 
long-standing tradition in Mexican 
government, and they are fre­
quently criticized for being both 
voluntary and unenforceable. 
SEDUE has pu t teeth into the 
agreements, though, by forcing 
companies to post bonds based on 
the total investment promised by 
the company for pollution abate­
m ent programs.
Plant shutdowns have also 
sparked some new fears am ong for­
eign industries operating in Mex­
ico. W hen SEDUE recently shut 
down a General Motors (GM) 
plant in Matamoros for 12 days, 
the auto giant was forced to stop 
some global car production, Reyes 
said. As a result, GM has agreed to 
build new waste-water treatm ent 
facilities at 34 plants, he said.
SEDUE and the EPA are also dis­
cussing the idea o f assessing user 
fees against border industries that 
would by channeled into a “green 
fund,” to be used for m onitoring 
border pollution and building in­
frastructure im provem ent projects. 
Maquiladoras, now considered cost 
ra ther than profit centers, pay only 
negligible taxes to Mexico. A legal 
framework to allow such user fees 
has already been established in 
Mexican law, Reyes says. U nder 
new regulations that became effec­
tive in October 1991, even para- 
state industries can be charged 
such fees, he said.
SEDUE’s new financial and tech­
nical resources, and the coopera­
tive effort with the EPA, will allow
Mexico for the first time to assess 
its overall border pollution prob­
lems and the cost o f resolving 
them, Reyes believes. Yet, US and 
Mexican environm ental groups 
warn that if attention is no t con­
tinually focused on natural re­
source issues in US-Mexican trade 
relations, both  SEDUE and the
EPA will have less incentive to 
m aintain their present m om entum  
and follow through on an effective 
border m anagem ent plan. ■
Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission 
from El Financiero Internacional 
(Mexico City), August 26, 1991.
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In Memoriam: Gordon K. Lewis
by Anthony P. Maingot
T he lecturer could barely look over the five-foot high lectern. All that could be seen o f his head were thick bifocals and long hair p inned in the 
back with bobby pins. His lectures, 
in English, always seemed to go 
over the heads of his few and 
mostly Spanish-speaking students. 
To this student, fresh from four 
years of com petent but ideologi­
cally uniform  US education, his lec­
tures were eye-openers. They were 
a challenge to critical thinking as 
well as a call to jo in  action to 
thought.
This was in 1961 at the Uni- 
versidad de Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, 
an intellectual oasis in the Carib­
bean led by Jaim e Benitez, one of 
that extraordinary generation of 
m en who had helped Luis Munoz 
Marin transform the island. The 
Universidad de Puerto Rico was also a 
bit of a sanctuary for the disen­
franchised population of a bland 
US academic environment, such as 
ethnic and racial minorities, gays, 
and those who, like Gordon K. 
Lewis, were victims of Senator 
Joseph McCarthy’s philistine reign 
o f ideological terror. To be sure, 
Puerto Rico also had constraints 
on academic freedom. Lewis would 
deal with these in his usual devas­
tating style in his most im portant 
book, Puerto Rico: Freedom, and Power 
in the Caribbean (1965). The univer­
sity’s requirem ent that any political 
activities on campus no t be parti­
san, wrote Lewis, “is rather like re­
questing a system of marriage 
without sex.”
Anthony P. Maingot is editor of 
Hemisphere.
Lewis was passionately partisan: 
he was a lifelong Fabian and also a 
lifelong Christian. In the pursuit of 
an understanding o f Caribbean re­
alities, both belief systems took on 
distinctly radical tones. He infused 
those systems, no t merely with an 
astonishing knowledge o f the his­
tory of hum an frailties, bu t with a 
capacity for moral indignation.
While he was Welsh by birth, he 
was intellectually from the Carib­
bean. H e was firmly a part of those 
societies and cultures that, having 
had to build from the vile rubble of 
slavery, developed in the process a 
low threshold of tolerance for injus­
tice and exploitation. Because such 
a stance is never without inner ten­
sions and contradictions, Lewis 
could not escape these either. He 
was, for instance, always critical of 
the Puerto Rican “Estado Libre Aso- 
ciado" status, but at the same time a 
great adm irer o f its fundam ental 
architect, Munoz Marin. He intrin­
sically disliked the Leninist variety 
o f socialism bu t adm ired its most 
fervent Caribbean practitioner, 
Fidel Castro.
In his Main Currents in Caribbean 
Thought (1983), Lewis condemns 
the Caribbean as an intrinsically 
racist region, yet concludes that if 
racial democracy is to be created 
anywhere it will be there. Perhaps 
Lewis in 1983 was clinging to hopes 
that everyday experience was prov­
ing to be misplaced. This hope was 
perhaps most directly expressed in 
1969 in his The Growth of the Modem 
West Indies. The correct path for 
the West Indies, said Lewis, was “a 
socialist ideology so that the nation­
alist ethic may be m arried to the 
planned organization of social 
equality.” Alas, the Caribbean— 
and the world—is going in the 
opposite direction.
Lewis was no t one to fly with the 
flock or assert the popular view.
Yet his willingness to dismiss “prag­
matic considerations,” “public opin­
ion,” “majority consent,” or “m ere 
utilitarian advantage” certainly did 
no t represent his general view on 
the Caribbean, whose majoritarian 
democracy Lewis m ore often than 
no t applauded and prom oted.
Here, then, was Gordon K.
Lewis, Welsh bu t also Caribbean; 
socialist but also the grand teacher 
of the philosophy of Edm und 
Burke, British parliamentary prin­
ciples, and the American founding 
fathers. A complex m an of many 
nuances but, above all, unequivo­
cally engaged.
The Caribbean has lost its most 
complete representative o f the in­
tellectual enterprise. It is left, fortu­
nately, with the literary legacy of 
that enterprise. Those who, like 
this student, learned from him, will 
sorely miss him. ■
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Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
. . .  But We Can Still Be 
Friends . . .
A m inor tiff developed between 
Brazilian authorities and General 
Motors do Brasil. The dispute 
erupted when the Sao-Paulo-based 
vice president for GM’s Latin Amer­
ican operations, Robert B. Stone, 
announced on May 28,1991, his re­
tirem ent and pending replacem ent 
by Richard C. Nerod, president of 
GM’s Mexico operations. Nerod 
sent a strong message to Brazil’s 
governm ent by announcing that 
GM’s regional headquarters would 
move from Sao Paulo to Miami. 
According to a GM spokesperson, 
“poor communications between 
Brazil and other South American 
countries” was one of the major rea­
sons for the shift in corporate head­
quarters. GM indicated, however, 
that its plans to invest m ore than 
$1 billion in Brazil would not be 
altered.
Cholera Update
Cholera has now appeared in US 
waters—in Mobile Bay. How the dis­
ease found its way to the Gulf of 
Mexico and into Alabama’s oysters 
remains a mystery. The cause may 
have been contam inated sewage 
dum ped by a ship carrying infected 
workers from South America. O r a 
Food and Drug Administration lab 
adjacent to Mobile Bay may have 
accidentally released the bacteria. 
Meanwhile, health authorities have 
posted signs to keep boaters and 
swimmers away from the shellfish 
shoals.
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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It’s All in the Body Language
No substantive agreem ents on the 
North American free-trade agree­
m ent were reached at the Seattle 
m eeting (August 19-20, 1991) of 
trade negotiators representing 
Canada, the US, and Mexico.
There were, however, some sub­
stantive disagreements. The most 
notable occurred when Mexico’s 
commerce secretary, Jaim e Serra 
Puche, corrected a US State Depart­
m ent translator on three occasions 
and offered his own translation of 
the press conference’s final ques­
tion. According to the Mexican offi­
cial, the translator was giving the 
forum ’s questions a m ore con­
frontational m eaning than was in­
tended by the Mexican journalists, 
who were directing them  at US 
trade negotiator Carla Hills.
We’ve Heard This Before
According to Echoes from Eco-Tours, 
a Panam anian newsletter, Pana­
m a’s “best kept secret” is the 
country’s accessible rain forests. 
Founded by Howard Wenzel, a US 
expatriate in Panama, Eco-Tours de 
Panama S.A. is dedicated to nature 
and adventure tourism. The new 
eco-enterprise has a special agree­
m ent with the Smithsonian Tropi­
cal Research Institute to run the 
“Panama Canal Rainforest Adven­
tu re.” According to the newsletter, 
the “thrill of passing large ocean 
liners and gigantic container ships 
in the Canal in a small boat, com­
bined with the observation of m on­
keys, turtles, tropical birds and 
other fauna and flora in the teem­
ing ra in fo rest. . . make this trip 
one o f the most unique and enjoy­
able jungle tours in the world.”
Best Seller #1
Venezuelan author Arturo Uslar 
Pietri donated, in August 1991, 
$16,000 from the Premio de Novela 
Romulo Gallegos to the Venezuelan 
educational institute, Fey Alegria. 
Uslar Pietri received the prize for 
his novel, La visita en el tiempo.
U pon making the gift, the author 
declared that education is Vene­
zuela’s “most im portant, dramatic 
and fundam ental problem .” He ob­
served that “with all the money we 
spend, we d o n ’t have in Venezuela 
education that emphasizes the 
country’s needs” (AgenceFrance 
Presse, August 15,1991).
Slow Flow in the Bayou State
Louisiana governor Buddy Roemer 
has published “Closing the Busi­
ness Gap with Latin America,” a 
b lueprint for the Bayou state’s new 
international trade strategy. Accord­
ing to the August 1991 report, the 
state’s “molasses mentality” and the 
absence of inform ation for small 
firms have been major impedi­
ments to the growth o f trade be­
tween Louisiana and Latin 
America.
Mixed Message
The Guatemalan government, not 
known for its friendly treatm ent of 
its indigenous population, is now 
m arketing the music of Guate­
m ala’s native groups. A project 
directed by the Instituto Guatemal- 
teco de Turismo is recording and dis­
tributing the music of 24 native 
groups, including the somber 
sounds o f the Kekchi Indians and 
the reggae rhythms of Black Caribs.
Environmental Music
Milton Nascimento, considered by 
many to be Brazil’s leading popu­
lar musician, has tu rned  his at­
tention to the country’s festering 
debate over the environment. He 
has released a new album, TXAI 
(Columbia Records), which in the 
language o f the Kaxinawa Indians 
m eans “the o ther half of m e.” The 
album interprets the threats to the 
Brazilian rain forest and the in­
digenous groups who live there. 
The album includes brief segments 
of music from Amazonian tribes, 
juxtaposed with Nascimento’s 
usual mix o f jazz and rock. Ac­
cording to Times of the Americas 
(August 21, 1991), the indigenous 
sounds are the “real soul o f the 
recording.”
Castro’s Future
The almost breathless pace of 
changes in the USSR and Eastern 
Europe raises the inevitable ques­
tion about Cuba: How m uch 
longer can Fidel Castro maintain 
his power? A 1991 Freedom House 
publication, “Cuba in the Nine­
ties,’’ provides insight into the issue 
through analyses by leading ob­
servers of Cuban affairs, including 
Senator Claiborne Pell, Jorge 
Dominguez, Wayne Smith, Luis 
Aguilar, Irving Louis Horowitz, and 
Carmelo Mesa-Lago. The magazine- 
length publication is one of the 
first docum ents to be published by 
“The Cuba Roundtable,” organized 
by Freedom House to provide a 
forum  for the discussion o f current 
developments in Cuba and their im­
pact on US-Cuban relations.
Who Is Gaspar Morn?
Many know Gaspar Ilom as the 
hero o f Men of Maize, Nobel laure­
ate Miguel Angel Asturias’s novel 
o f Mayan life in Central America.
In recent times, “Gaspar Ilom ” has 
been the nom  de guerre o f a 
leader of the Organization Revolu- 
cionaria del Pueblo en Armas, one of 
Guatemala’s antigovernm ent insur­
gencies. The person behind the 
nam e is actually Rodrigo Asturias, 
the oldest son of the elder Asturias.
Jet-Set Migrants
Miami has become a mecca for 
Latin American pop stars, who are 
now establishing residences in the 
South Florida city. Among those 
who periodically call Miami hom e 
are Venezuelan singer Jose Luis 
Rodriguez (“El Pum a”), Nicara­
guan salsa singer Luis Enrique, 
Argentine balladeer Maria Marta 
Serra Lima, and Dominican 
fo lk/m erengue star Juan Luis 
Guerra. They jo in  Spanish super­
stars Paloma San Basilio and Julio 
Iglesias, who also reside in Miami.
Best Seller #2
O ne of the hottest books in Mexico 
is Elena Poniatowska’s Todo Mexico 
(Mexico, DF: Editorial Diana, 
1990). The text is a collection of in­
terviews conducted by the renown 
Mexican au thor with notable per­
sonalities from the world o f His­
panic affairs, including Spain’s 
most famous bullfighter, Manuel 
Benitez, “El Cordobes”; Jorge Luis 
Borges, the Argentine writer; and 
the acclaimed filmmaker Luis 
Bunuel, a Spaniard who took
Mexican citizenship. Although the 
interviews are somewhat dated, 
they once again reveal Ponia­
towska’s rich interviewing skills.
Watch Out
The Smithsonian Institution is now 
publishing New World, a quincen­
tenary publication “dedicated to 
the Americas.” The newsletter 
mixes scholarly analysis with news 
notes on cultural activities that are 
being scheduled around the 500th 
anniversary of Columbus’s arrival 
in the Caribbean. Volume two of 
the publication provides in-depth 
analyses of Columbus’s impact 
from the African-American per­
spective through essays by Franklin 
W. Knight, a jo h n s  Hopkins Univer­
sity historian, and Sydney March, a 
Jam aican poet who edits the Conti­
nent, a Washington-based African- 
American news publication.
Worth Visiting
The Monterrey Museum of Con­
tem porary Art opened its doors on 
June 29, 1991, with an exhibit that 
displayed 300 works by 62 artists 
from 17 countries. The $11-million 
project is symbolic of Mexico’s 
em erging role as a m ediator and 
in terpreter between Latin America 
and the US.
On the Move
Richard Nuccio, formerly of the 
Inter-American Dialogue, is now 
on the staff of the House Subcom­
mittee on Western H em isphere Af­
fairs. Nuccio replaces long-time 
staffer Nancy Agris.
Hemisphere •  Fall 1991
F E A T
Restructuring Argentina
by William C. Smith
Carlos Menem’s neoliberal policies have achieved short-term success in 
tranquilizing Argentina’s raging inflation. But can his program of “creative 
destruction”reverse the economy’s long-term structural decline?
C
arlos Saul Menem as­
sum ed the presidency on 
July 8, 1989, with Argen­
tina obsessed by raging 
hyperinflation. From Au­
gust 1988 through July
1989, consum er prices soared 
3,610% and wholesale prices 
5,062%. M enem responded with 
radical, neoliberal “free-market” re­
forms that explicitly repudiated the 
populist and statist economic postu­
lates defended by Peronism since 
the 1940s. Indicative of changes to 
come, key members of the presi­
dential entourage grandly spoke of 
a “new bloc of social, political, eco­
nomic, and perhaps military 
power,” whose task was nothing 
less than the “reconstruction of Ar­
gentine capitalism.” Menem him­
self expressed the intention to 
“pulverize the crisis.” He warned 
his fellow citizens to brace them ­
selves for “a tough, costly, and se­
vere adjustm ent,” requiring “major 
surgery without anesthesia.” How­
ever vivid the language, the new 
president was no t exaggerating the
William C. Smith is associate professor 
of political science at the University of 
Miami. He is the author of Authoritar­
ianism and the Crisis o f the Argen­
tine Political Economy (Stanford 
University Press, 1989).
pain that would soon afflict Argen­
tine society.
The economic logic o f M enem ’s 
neoliberal project is undeniable; its 
social and political viability, how­
ever, remains highly problematic.
A key issue concerns the changing 
balance o f power between the exec­
utive and legislative branches of 
government, on the one hand, and 
between the state and the most in­
ternationally competitive sectors of 
business, on the other. A nother 
issue is the willingness of the rest of 
society—middle-class consumers, 
organized labor, the weaker, do­
mestically oriented segments of 
urban and rural business, and oth­
ers—to shoulder the huge social 
costs resulting from the shrinkage 
of the state’s economic role and 
the “freeing” of the market.
Menem’s “Productive 
Revolution”
The thrust o f M enem ’s “productive 
revolution” was first revealed in the 
“Plan BB,” nam ed after Bunge & 
Born, A rgentina’s most powerful 
multinational corporation and, for 
Peronism, long a reviled symbol of 
vendepatria (“sell o u t”) capitalism. 
Unveiled by Miguel Roig and 
im plem ented by Nestor Rapanelli, 
his successor as economy minister, 
the Plan BB consisted o f em er­
gency measures—such as a 170% 
currency devaluation, 200-640% 
hikes in public-sector tariffs, and re­
ductions in state subsidies—as well 
as an ambitious b lueprin t for a new 
m odel of economic development. 
Steps toward this new m odel were 
taken with congressional approval 
of a “revolutionary project” calling 
for the rapid downsizing o f the 
Argentine state and the drastic de­
regulation of the country’s semi­
closed economy.
The start was auspicious. The 
Menem governm ent’s image of au­
thority, com bined with positive 
business expectations and con­
sum er enthusiasm generated by 
Peronism ’s conversion to neo­
liberalism, quickly cooled the fires 
of hyperinflation. The Banco Cen­
tral s foreign-exchange position 
and the state’s fiscal situation im­
proved dramatically, and a simula­
crum of normalcy was restored. 
Macroeconomic stability, however, 
proved extremely fragile. The fiscal 
surplus was insufficient to cover 
the Banco Central s escalating in­
terest bill, and the cycle o f public- 
sector borrowing and domestic 
debt accumulation proceeded 
without interruption.
By Decem ber 1989 renewed 
currency speculation against the 
austral forced Rapanelli to gamble 
on major modifications o f the
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Plan BB, including a unilateral 
m oratorium  on the internal debt. 
Public uproar from entrepreneurs, 
agrarian producers, organized 
labor, and the political parties— 
including the Peronists—forced 
Rapanelli’s resignation. His replace­
m ent was Antonio Erman Gonza­
lez, who had served as secretary of 
economy of La Rioja—A rgentina’s 
poorest province—during the 
1970s under then provincial gov­
ernor Carlos Menem.
C onfronted by rising inflation, 
renewed speculation, and the 
threat of a run on the banks,
Erman Gonzalez announced the 
“Bonex Plan,” whose centerpiece 
was the compulsory conversion of 
commercial bank time deposits 
greater than 1 million australes 
(slightly m ore than $500) into ten- 
year, dollar-denom inated bonds 
paying 6% annual interest. This 
unilateral action wiped out most 
of the public-sector’s short-term 
domestic debt, replacing it with 
medium-term external debt.
By causing a sharp reduction in 
the nation’s liquidity, the Bonex 
Plan exacerbated A rgentina’s al­
ready steep recession. Yet the dol­
lar continued to rise, a problem  
com pounded when the Interna­
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) 
suspended the release of funds 
under an earlier agreem ent. De­
spite the governm ent’s promises of 
deepened austerity, Washington 
deem ed that Argentina had made 
insufficient progress to be included 
in the debt renegotiations envi­
sioned under the Brady Plan.
This difficult scenario set the 
stage for what the Buenos Aires 
financial newspaper AmbitoFinan- 
ciero baptized as a “m arket coup” 
responsible for a new round of viru­
lent hyperinflation. For the 12
m onths ending in March 1990, the 
consum er price index had risen a 
phenom enal 20,594%.
Yet another emergency package 
was decreed to bring the madly 
careening economy u nder a sem­
blance of control. Relying on a 
strong fiscal shock, the measures 
enacted by Erman Gonzalez and 
his team checked hyperinflation 
and improved public finances, 
albeit at the expense of public 
services, including education and 
the judicial system.
Yet another emergency 
measure was decreed 
to bring the madly 
careening economy 
under a semblance of 
control, based on a 
strong fiscal shock.
With the threat of hyperinfla­
tion receding somewhat, the 
M enem governm ent concentrated 
on advancing its neoliberal agenda 
o f dismantling the interventionist 
state and opening the economy to 
the rigors o f international com­
petition. In July 1990 Erman Gon­
zalez enacted liberalizing measures 
to deregulate imports and elimi­
nate protectionist measures bene- 
fiting local industry. In August the 
Ministerio deEconomia was given 
broad new powers to accelerate the
privatization a n d /o r  liquidation of 
the state’s largest enterprises. In 
October Menem went further, sign­
ing a decree m andating the privati­
zation within six m onths o f many 
state-owned companies, such as 
the YPF petroleum  company, Gas 
del Estado, Segba, Agua y Energia, 
Obras Sanitarias, the post office, 
and the port administration. Con­
tracts to private companies were 
awarded for secondary oil and natu­
ral gas exploration. Not even the 
military-industrial complex was to 
be spared in this privatizing frenzy, 
as many industries belonging to 
the holding company Fabricaciones 
Militares were slated for transfer to 
private ownership.
Privatization was plagued with 
multiple difficulties. Critics alleged 
that hasty privatization favored the 
powerful grupos economicos (e.g., 
Perez Companc, Bunge & Born, 
Techint, Pescarmoma, Acindar, 
Celulosa Argentina, Bridas) with 
huge unearned profits. The 
privatization drive was m arred by 
considerable improvisation, if not 
by downright incom petence. Com­
pounding these problem s was the 
failure to pu t a regulatory frame­
work into place before companies 
such as Aerolmeas Argentinas and 
ENTEL, the telecommunications 
monopoly, were placed on the 
auction block.
Meanwhile, increasingly harsh 
anti-inflation policies plunged the 
economy into “hyper-recession.” 
Deindustrialization continued, as 
did the contraction of real wages. 
Indeed, blue-collar industrial wages 
were now sufficient to acquire only 
40% of the m arket basket of basic 
goods and services, while unem ­
ployment and underem ploym ent 
surpassed the unprecedented  mark 
of 17%.
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The M enem government 
greeted this dismal economic news 
with equanimity, even suggesting 
that massive social dislocations 
were positive signs that market- 
oriented policies were working.
The only bright spot was that Ar­
gentina’s 1990 trade surplus had 
risen significantly. The main rea­
son for this rise, however, was the 
collapse o f domestic dem and and 
investment, which pu t a dam per on 
imports. A nother reason was the se­
vere overvaluation of the austral, 
caused mainly by tight monetary 
policy and the hoarding of dollars 
by many firms to m eet their pay­
rolls and tax obligations.
By the end  of 1990 M enem ’s 
neoliberal project found itself at a 
dangerous impasse: despite the re­
cession, inflation for the year sur­
passed 1,800%. Nevertheless, 
Menem and his economic team 
chose to stay the course. In Decem­
ber Erm an Gonzalez further liberal­
ized foreign trade, imposed yet 
another “deflationary shock,” and 
approved a “tax amnesty” perm it­
ting the repatriation of “black” dol­
lars without fear of legal penalties.
These improvisations, plus new 
emergency course corrections in 
January 1991, touched off a specula­
tive frenzy, causing the austral to 
lose 50% of its value against the 
dollar.
M ounting scandals over corrup­
tion in high places—such as the 
“Swiftgate” affair in which US 
ambassador Terrence Todm an 
accused high functionaries of de­
m anding payoffs from US m ultina­
tionals—and the threat o f another 
hyperinflationary spike set off a 
tragicomic round of musical chairs. 
W hen the dust settled, M enem ’s 
new cabinet lineup saw Domingo 
Cavallo leave the Ministerio de Rela- 
ciones Exteriores to take over at the 
em battled Ministerio de Economia. It 
also saw Guido Di Telia, previously 
Argentina’s ambassador in Wash­
ington, shift to Relaciones Exteriores, 
and Erman Gonzalez transfer to 
the Ministerio deDefensa.
In March 1991 new economy 
m inister Cavallo prescribed the ulti­
mate in anti-inflation shock ther­
apy: on April 1 the austral became 
freely convertible into dollars. Fur­
ther, the congress passed a new law 
prohibiting the Banco Central from 
printing money to cover budget 
deficits unless new emissions were 
fully backed by gold or foreign cur­
rency. To liberalize foreign trade 
and to make industry m ore com pet­
itive, the governm ent slashed im­
port duties. Argentina jo ined  
Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay in 
form ing MERCOSUR (Mercado 
Comun del Cono Sur) to bolster the 
region’s bargaining power in nego­
tiating a framework agreem ent 
with the US concerning a possible 
hem ispheric megamarket.
Like poker players 
betting the ranch, 
Cavallo and Menem, 
risked Argentina’s 
$5.5 billion in foreign 
reserves in a desperate 
effort to halt inflation 
in its tracks.
The Cavallo Plan, as the new 
package was dubbed, represented 
the 13th modification of the neo­
liberal m odel since Menem as­
sumed office. It was a dramatic 
gamble. Like poker players betting 
the ranch, Cavallo and Menem 
risked A rgentina’s approximately 
$5.5 billion in foreign reserves in a 
desperate effort to halt inflation in 
its tracks. The risks were as high as 
the stakes: the “convertibility” com­
ponen t of the Cavallo Plan m eant 
that should wealthy Argentines per­
ceive that the governm ent lacked 
the will or the hard-currency re­
serves to maintain the austral at
10,000 to the US dollar, they could
immediately exchange their aus- 
trales for dollars, leaving the Banco 
Central s coffers empty.
The Argentine economy was 
already extensively “dollarized”: 
the value o f greenbacks in circula­
tion was estimated to be greater 
than the sum of australes in the 
hands o f the public and on deposit 
in the banking system. This fitct 
gave the plan plausibility and 
Cavallo a chance to achieve the 
elusive goal o f reactivating at least 
some economic sectors (e.g., agri­
business and high value-added 
m anufacturing industries capable 
o f exporting) without endangering 
monetary stabilization. But if this 
latest version of neoliberalism re­
structuring were to breathe life 
into the prostrate Argentine 
economy, the state would have to 
achieve a substantial and enduring 
fiscal surplus while also m aintain­
ing a large trade surplus. An agree­
m ent with A rgentina’s creditor 
banks and the IMF to reduce ex­
ternal debt service and to attract a 
m odest flow o f overseas investment 
capital was also imperative. All 
these propositions were dubious 
at best.
In sum M enem ’s aggressive anti­
statist, pro-market policies accen­
tuated the dismantling of the 
country’s industrial base that had 
gathered m om entum  under the 
post-1976 military dictatorship and 
continued unchecked under Raul 
Alfonsin after 1983. Despite draco­
nian deflationary policies, prices 
continued to rise at moderately 
high rates. Moreover the “hyper­
stabilization” strategy resulted in 
the worst recession in the history of 
Argentine industry.
The consequences of this reces­
sion could be clearly seen in the 
state’s fiscal policies. For example, 
as recently as 1987 public-sector sal­
aries represented 12% of gross do­
mestic product (GDP), bu t recent 
austerity policies (including the dis­
missal of 60,000 public employees 
and pledges to trim thousands 
m ore) have reduced this figure to 
less than 6%. Curtailm ent o f public- 
sector investments triggered a vio-
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lent decline in the construction sec­
tor (a major employer o f unskilled 
labor) and in the strategic capital 
goods sector. Reduced expendi­
ture, higher tax revenues, and prof­
its from the sale o f state enterprises 
resulted in small fiscal surpluses 
that have drastically reduced the 
state’s absorption of credit. While 
the latter p u t downward pressure 
on interest rates, prolonged re­
cession m eant that even much 
cheaper credit was insufficient in­
centive to reignite private-sector in­
vestment. Stagnation continued, 
with few hopes for quick economic 
reactivation.
Social Costs of Neoliberalism
M enem ’s em brace of free-market 
economic reforms jeopardized his 
personal popularity and threat­
ened to underm ine the allegiance 
o f Peronism ’s populist social base. 
Neoliberalism also posed serious 
questions about the future of dem o­
cratic consolidation. From the lofty 
heights of neoclassical economic 
theory, the logic of neoliberal re­
structuring and the exigencies of 
democratic politics may have 
seemed compatible and even 
mutually reinforcing. At least in 
the short run, however, M enem ’s
policies engendered tension, con­
flict, and contradiction.
The industrial sector’s deepen­
ing crisis and the continued shrink­
age of the domestic m arket have 
profound implications for distribu­
tive justice. GDP per capita de­
clined m ore than one-fourth 
during the 1980s—regressing to 
the figure reached around 1960— 
with income inequalities worsening 
as well. The share of national in­
come going to one-tenth o f the 
population is about 46%, up 
sharply from 35% in 1974. The 
poor are now estimated as repre­
senting at least 30% of the nation’s
rate of manufacturing wages
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population and more than 40% of 
the population of m etropolitan 
Buenos Aires. Not only have living 
standards worsened for the poorest 
groups. In addition there has 
em erged a category o f “new pau­
pers”—workers and middle-class 
employees who formerly obtained 
a reasonable standard of living, but 
who in recent years have fallen into 
poverty.
Prospects for economic stabili­
zation and, m ore optimistically, 
long-term growth hinge on the 
em ergence of an internationally 
competitive model of development 
to replace the post-World War II 
m odel of import-substitution indus­
trialization. But Menemstroika re­
structuring faces a major political 
obstacle—the dismantling of the 
populist coalition (long favored by 
both Peronists and Radicals) of 
business and labor interests tied to 
the domestic market. The irony is 
that the Menem governm ent’s neo­
liberalism has encountered signifi­
cant opposition from within the 
ranks of the entrepreneurs them ­
selves. In an effort to force the gov­
ernm ent to eliminate export taxes, 
rural producers o f grains, vegeta­
ble oils, and m eat have frequently 
refused to exchange their foreign 
currency at the Banco Central. Mean­
while, industrialists producing both 
consum er durable and nondurable 
items have voiced misgivings about 
the emphasis on agriculture and pe­
troleum  in the governm ent’s plans 
to return  Argentina to the ranks of 
the world’s leading commodity ex­
porters. More generally, many en­
trepreneurs fear that if the 
economy is opened too rapidly, 
and if state subsidies are slashed 
too drastically, the private sector 
will be sacrificed on the twin altars 
of international competitiveness 
and fiscal austerity.
Organized labor, which con­
tinues under Peronist hegemony, is 
another key m em ber of the popu­
list coalition. Ultimately, the viabil­
ity o f the neoliberal model will 
hinge on the state leadership’s abil­
ity to contain labor militancy, im­
plem ent a restrictive wage policy,
and prom ote the “flexibilization” 
o f the labor m arket by eliminating 
rules favoring workers within enter­
prises. M enem ’s policies have pro­
voked an open rift within the ranks 
o f the Peronist labor movement. 
The officially recognized Confedera­
tion General del Trabajo-San Martin 
has given its grudging support to 
M enem ’s policies; in contrast the 
antigovernm ent CGT- Azopardo, 
which includes many public-sector
Neoliberal 
prescriptions call for 
rolling backing the 
state’s role in the 
economy and society. 
Ironically, though, 
they may well require 
not less but more state 
intervention.
employees and other militant 
unionists, has strongly opposed 
plans for privatization and liberali­
zation. The CGT has consistently re­
pulsed governmental dem ands for 
a social truce and openly sought to 
rally support for an alternative pol­
icy to reactivate the economy.
Moves toward revitalization within 
Peronist labor could spell serious 
trouble for M enem ’s project.
Not surprisingly, the strongest 
supporters of M enem ’s policies are 
to be found in an emerging center- 
right alliance between ardently 
menemista sectors of Peronism and 
the conservative Union del Centro 
Democratico. Peronism ’s “historic 
identity” and its com m itm ent to so­
cial justice will be sorely tested at 
the level o f rank-and-file loyalty. It 
may also have to cope with possible 
electoral and parliamentary realign­
ments in future congressional and 
gubernatorial elections.
Underlying these political and 
economic transformations stands a 
striking contradiction. O n the one 
hand, neoclassical prescriptions 
call for rolling backing the state’s 
role in the economy and society; 
on the o ther hand, the state bu­
reaucracy must assume additional 
roles and responsibilities (for 
which there is little social legitima­
tion) in support of a market- 
driven economy. In fact, greater 
economic orthodoxy may well re­
quire no t less bu t m ore state inter­
vention—albeit with different 
objectives and different benefici­
aries—as well as m ore power con­
centrated in the hands of the 
state’s bureaucratic elite.
This smaller bu t m ore agile 
(and in some respects m ore power­
ful) state has quite naturally been 
welcomed by the dom inant players 
in the local and transnational busi­
ness communities. The agro-export 
interests and industrial capitalists 
capable of exporting successfully to 
world markets, however, have been 
extremely reluctant to assume their 
role as investors—a requirem ent of 
M enem ’s plans for industrial recon­
version and greater international 
competitiveness.
Moreover, the grupos economicos 
(such as Perez Companc and 
Bunge & Born) and business’s dom 
inant industrial, financial, and agro 
export sectors have consistently 
used their enhanced leverage to 
make several demands: the elimina­
tion of the fiscal deficit, the end of 
price controls, the introduction of 
a favorable exchange-rate regime, 
and a heavier hand with organized 
labor. Some of the m ore conserva­
tive business sectors—im patient 
with the cumbersome procedures 
o f democratic politics—have even 
urged Menem to steamroll the con­
gress and to im plem ent market- 
oriented reforms through the 
executive’s decree powers. Evi­
dently at least some entrepreneurs 
harbor a nostalgic longing for the 
“efficiency” of policymaking by 
authoritarian edict.
Tragically, given an economy 
seriously weakened by decades of
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mismanagement, this aggressive 
neoliberalism probably will no t en­
gender vigorous growth and devel­
opm ent. In view of Argentina’s 
current political and economic con­
ditions, free-market policies may 
militate in favor of a perverse out­
come—the institutionalization of 
speculative habits by business, 
labor, and consumers. An economy 
based on the logic of p lunder and 
get-rich-quick speculation is hardly 
conducive to the “creative destruc­
tion” so adm ired by advocates of 
unfettered m arket economies. 
Despite the reform ing zeal of the 
M enem team and its 1991 success 
in slashing inflation, Argentina’s 
long-term scenario may be one of 
high inflation, low investment 
rates, and mediocre macroeco­
nomic performance.
The long-term implications of 
M enem ’s neoliberalism for demo­
cratic politics are troubling as well. 
To be sure, the specter of authori­
tarianism has certainly receded 
and the prospects for consolidation 
of the electoral and representa­
tional aspects o f democracy have 
improved considerably. Neverthe­
less, the economy’s decline is 
deeply at odds with the forging of a 
stable democratic class com pro­
mise encompassing the congress 
and the major political parties, as 
well as capital, labor, and the mid­
dle class.
A rgentina’s politics are im­
m ersed in a sea o f em bittered and 
fractious interests, whose horizon 
o f hopes and expectations often 
fails to surface above the impera­
tive o f immediate needs. As was 
true of earlier resistance to authori­
tarianism, contem porary struggles 
for democracy will be inextricably 
linked to Argentina’s Sisyphean 
search for social justice and a via­
ble model o f economic growth. ■
Editor’s Note: Revised version of the 
postscript to the paperback edition of 
Authoritarianism and the Crisis of 
the Argentine Political Economy 
(1991).
John D. French, Editor
The only publication exclusively dedicated to:
News on Latin American trade unions 
and their struggles 
News on Inter-American labor solidarity 
The latest research 
about labor, workers, and women 
News on labor studies organizations and projects
□ Please enter my subscription (two issues) for US $15.00 (US $30.00 institutional).
Back issues US $7.50 individual /  $15.00 institutional.
□ Please send me
sets of the English and Non-English bibliographies of recent books and articles on 
Latin American labor at US $6.00.
___ copy(ies) of "Labor Studies in Brazil," by Sonia de Avelar (Occasional Paper #1), at
US$1.00 each.
___ copy(ies) of "Recent Studies on Organized Labor and the Working Class," by Hobart
A. Spalding (Occasional Paper #2), at US$2.50 each.
___ copy(ies) of "Colombia Balance Huelgui'stico de 1990," by Alvaro Delgado
(Occasional Paper #3), at US 2.50 each.
copv(ies) of Robert Alexander: The Complete Bibliography of a Pioneering Latin 
Americanist at US $12.00.
Please make check payable to "Florida International University."
Address
Mail this form with your payment to:
Latin American Labor Studies Publications 
Center for Labor Research and Studies 
Florida International University 
University Park-W MO TR #2 
Miami, Florida 33199
Hemisphere •  Fall 1991
Features: Argentina
Abandoning the “Third Position”
by Aldo C. Vacs
A
mong the surprising 
policy turns taken by 
Argentine president 
Carlos Menem was his 
decision to abandon 
the nationalist, non- 
aligned path of Peronism ’s “T hird 
Position.” U pon entering the presi­
dency in 1989, Menem declared a 
new, pragmatic approach to for­
eign policy. Domestically the ad­
ministration adopted a neoliberal 
economic strategy designed to re­
duce the external debt and attract 
investment capital. Along the same 
lines, the adm inistration initiated a 
foreign policy geared to improving 
relations with the US and the Euro­
pean Community (EC), reestab­
lishing relations with Great Britain, 
and continuing the process o f eco­
nomic integration with the coun­
tries of the Southern Cone.
Menem em barked upon this 
new path of domestic and foreign 
policy by appointing Domingo 
Cavallo—a Harvard-trained econ­
omist and form er president of 
Argentina’s Banco Central—as min­
ister of foreign relations in July
1989 and then as minister of econ­
omy in January 1991. Cavallo 
viewed Argentina’s economic prob­
lems as resulting from the nation’s 
conjuncture o f “socialism without a 
plan and capitalism without a mar­
ket.” His response fits squarely on 
the m arket side, seeking to gain
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access to foreign markets for Argen­
tine goods while opening Argen­
tina’s m arket to foreign capital and 
goods. Cavallo’s replacem ent as 
minister of foreign relations, for­
m er ambassador to the US Guido 
Di Telia, has deepened the na­
tion’s com m itm ent to this domes­
tic and international approach.
Menem declared a 
new, pragmatic 
approach to foreign 
policy, geared to 
improving relations 
with the US and the 
EC, reestablishing 
relations with 
Great Britain, and 
continuing the 
process of economic 
integration with the 
rest of the Southern 
Cone.
An initial obstacle to this ap­
proach was US distrust, which was 
rooted in the tradition o f Peronist 
populism and nationalism, as well 
as M enem ’s contradictory cam­
paign statements. In response, the 
Menem adm inistration reduced 
A rgentina’s profile in the support 
group for Central America’s Con- 
tadora peace process and refused
to criticize the role of the US in 
Central American conflicts. More­
over the adm inistration shelved the 
idea of prom oting a bloc o f Third- 
World debtors, aligning instead 
with the US position in favor of 
individual-country negotiations 
with international creditors.
In his first m eeting with Presi­
den t George Bush, Menem 
pledged his support for the war 
against drugs, prom ised to honor 
A rgentina’s debt obligations, and 
agreed that democracy should be 
restored in Panama. The Menem 
governm ent mildly criticized the in­
vasion of Panam a as a violation of 
the principle o f nonintervention. 
Nonetheless, the governm ent care­
fully refrained from condem ning 
the invasion, declaring that the US 
action would no t im pair Argentine- 
US relations. Likewise, to gain 
favor with the US, M enem decided 
to ignore strong opposition at 
hom e and to stand alone am ong 
Latin American countries by partici­
pating in the anti-Iraq mobilization 
orchestrated by the UN.
During Bush’s December 1990 
visit to Buenos Aires, he congratu­
lated Menem for having quelled a 
military rebellion, praising Ar­
gentina’s president as a “world 
leader in the field o f privatization” 
and stating that US-Argentine rela­
tions “are now excellent and will 
continue to improve.” Bush prom ­
ised to support Argentina in its 
debt negotiations with interna­
tional banks, bu t m ade it clear that 
the country should no t expect im­
portant concessions.
The developm ent of cordial rela­
tions, however, did no t eliminate 
bilateral problems. In December
1990 US ambassador Terrence 
Todm an set a letter to minister of 
foreign relations Cavallo and min­
Hemisphere •  Fall 1991
ister of economy Erman Gonzalez, 
denouncing the alleged attem pt by 
several unnam ed high Argentine of­
ficials to obtain bribes from US 
companies before authorizing busi­
ness transactions. Though the 
Menem adm inistration rejected 
the accusations, the controversy 
reduced the prospects for new US 
investment and credit. In mid-1991 
another problem  arose when a US 
congressional investigation indi­
cated that several members of 
M enem ’s inner circle, such as the 
president’s sister-in-law and audi­
ences secretary, Amira Yoma, and 
her form er husband and chief of 
customs at A rgentina’s main in­
ternational airport, Ibrahim al 
Ibrahim, appeared to be involved 
in money-laundering transactions 
with drug traffickers and the Bank 
o f Credit and Commerce Inter­
national.
As for Western Europe, Menem 
and Cavallo announced their inter­
est in ending A rgentina’s feud with 
Great Britain over the Malvinas- 
Falklands, which led to the Febru­
ary 1990 reestablishment of 
Argentine-British diplomatic rela­
tions as well as various trade and in­
vestment agreements. Cavallo later 
signed an accord with the presi­
den t of the Council of Ministers 
of the EC to prom ote the develop­
m ent o f A rgentina’s economy and 
social services and to cooperate in 
scientific-technological programs 
and jo in t ventures. Reflecting the 
renewed interest o f European 
investors was the fact that consortia 
of Italian and Spanish companies 
purchased two major Argentine 
state companies: ENTEL, the state 
phone and telecommunications en­
terprise, and Aerolmeas Argentinas, 
the national airline.
M enem ’s Latin American for­
eign policy has focused on strength­
ening trade relations and creating 
jo in t enterprises with Brazil as well 
as fostering economic integration 
with Brazil and other neighboring 
countries. Argentine-Brazilian 
trade has been on the upswing, 
based on A rgentina’s increased ex­
ports of food products and imports
o f Brazilian m anufactured prod­
ucts. Most im portant, on March 26, 
1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay signed an agreem ent 
creating MERCOSUR (Mercado 
Comun del Cono Sur). They are 
currently negotiating the in­
corporation o f Chile and other 
South American countries, such 
as Bolivia and Peru, into the com­
m on market.
It is likely that Argentina’s 
foreign-policy tilt toward the US 
and Western Europe will continue, 
as the Menem adm inistration seeks 
diplomatic support for its debt 
negotiations with multilateral insti­
tutions as well as foreign aid and 
investment for its structural adjust­
m ent programs. W hat is less clear
is how successful this approach will 
be. So far, the benefits to Argen­
tina have been meager: a num ber 
o f symbolic diplomatic rewards, 
bu t no economic rewards of the 
m agnitude necessary to arrest the 
national economy’s long-term struc­
tural decline. Indeed, US and West­
ern  European agricultural and 
trade policies have worsened Ar­
gentina’s plight by m aintaining 
export subsidies and denying 
Argentine exports access to the 
leading foreign markets. In sum, 
while M enem ’s foreign policy has 
reduced the chances of confronta­
tion with the US and Western Eu­
rope, it has yet to be translated into 
the economic concessions antici­
pated by the policy’s architects. ■
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Lessons from Caribbean Elections
by Robert A. Pastor
A free and fair election is but one stride toward democracy. Given their 
deep-rooted economic crises and social conflicts, countries such as Suriname 
and Guyana must clear additional high hurdles in their quest for democracy 
and development
Democracy is a process under the rule of law whereby a people select and replace their leaders at regular intervals in an atm osphere that permits 
choice. Democracy requires a free 
election, but it is m ore than that. 
T hat is why we talk o f m onitoring 
an entire electoral process, and not 
ju st an election. For analytical and 
policy purposes, it is useful to di­
vide the democratic process into 
four stages: pre-election, election, 
transition, and consolidation. Each 
stage poses specific challenges that 
must be surm ounted before the 
country can successfully move on 
to the next one, arriving ultimately 
at a consolidated democracy in 
which civilian leaders have effective 
authority over the military.
Democracy is not a panacea for 
social and economic problems. In­
deed, in the short term democracy 
may seem poorly suited to solving a
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the Carter Center, and executive secre­
tary of the Council of Freely-Elected 
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nation’s economic crisis because so­
lutions often require austerity and 
sacrifices for long-term benefit.
This is why the transition from an 
authoritarian government to a con­
solidated democracy is often both 
tenuous and dangerous.
One problem with 
the democratic 
transitions is that 
the governments face 
a double bind: they 
need to broaden social 
access to the political 
process while also 
slashing social 
programs.
O ne problem  with the dem o­
cratic transitions in Latin America 
and the Caribbean today is that the 
new democracies face a double 
bind: they need to reduce the size 
of their governments and eliminate 
their fiscal and external deficits,
while simultaneously opening the 
political process to groups that are 
often making desperate dem ands 
for food, jobs, health, and educa­
tion. Although the governments of 
Latin American countries seem al­
most paralyzed by strikes, they have 
been m ore courageous than Presi­
den t George Bush, who has been 
unwilling to close the US fiscal or 
trade deficit as m uch as they have 
been com pelled to do.
While the actors in each country 
feel their particular difficulties are 
special, there is an almost uncanny 
pattern to the litany of problems 
and complaints. In the experience 
of the Council o f Freely-Elected 
Heads of Government in m onitor­
ing electoral processes and demo­
cratic transitions, the opposition in 
every country was deeply suspicious 
of both the incum bent government 
and the electoral process. This dis­
trust is born from a long and tragic 
history, and it is no t without con- 
tem poraryjustification. After every 
adverse incident, opposition lead­
ers extrapolate from the single in­
stance that a free election is not 
possible, or that it is part o f a con­
spiracy to rig the election. In most 
cases there was a problem, bu t it 
was no t as large, ominous, or wide­
spread as the opposition thought. 
More im portant, most of these 
problems could be resolved.
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What We’ve Learned
The Council of Freely-Elected 
Heads o f Government has moni­
tored electoral processes and demo­
cratic transitions in Nicaragua, 
Panama, the Dominican Republic, 
Guyana, Suriname, and Haiti (the 
dem ocratic transition of the latter, 
o f course, having suffered a tragic 
setback with the military coup of 
Septem ber 1991). In the course of 
its efforts the Council has learned a 
great deal, sometimes by making 
mistakes. What follows are six of 
the fundam ental lessons drawn 
from its experience.
First, the Council of Freely- 
Elected Heads of Governm ent con­
siders m onitoring the electoral 
process or the democratic transi­
tion only if invited by all the key 
parties—the government, its oppo­
sition, and the election officials.
This ensures that the Council will 
be viewed as fair and that its recom ­
m endations will be taken seriously.
Second, the Council tries to get 
involved early in the electoral pro­
cess. An election-monitoring group 
that arrives a day or two before an 
election can actually do a disservice 
to democracy.
Third, the Council has learned 
to listen closely to all charges of 
electoral irregularities, bu t not to 
leap to any conclusions. Finding 
the truth in a polarized society 
requires a great deal o f work; 
solving a problem  requires even 
more.
Fourth, the Council tries to 
work with all sides to identify the 
priority problems and seek their 
resolution. The fairness of an elec­
tion usually turns on the resolution 
of two to five crucial issues: the reg­
istration process, the campaign, 
the security of candidates and 
voters, access to the entire voting 
process by opposition poll watchers 
and international observers, and 
the vote count. The Council makes 
clear to all parties that its ability to 
judge a fair election depends on its 
success in resolving these issues.
Fifth, the Council has learned 
that the best role observers can
play is to try to encourage local par­
ties to work out as many of their 
problems am ong themselves as 
possible. This is essential because 
observers cannot resolve all the 
problem s that a culture of distrust 
evokes, and part of the democratic 
process requires that all parties 
compromise and work together.
In a consolidated democracy 
the opposition views the election 
as fair. In transitional elections the 
opposition does not have confi­
dence in the governm ent or the 
process, and the governm ent re­
jects the idea that the opposition 
should be able to veto the legiti­
macy o f a free election. The role of 
the observers is to m ediate the 
problems and serve as a surrogate 
for a fair process.
Sixth, the Council has learned 
to stay away from an electoral pro­
cess unless it can be certain that at 
the end it will be able to detect a 
significant pattern o f fraud. Two of 
its most im portant techniques are 
the random  selection of sites to ob­
serve the election and a “parallel 
count” to prevent m anipulation of 
the count. If the Council detects
fraud, it first tries to correct it, and 
if this effort fails, then the Council 
denounces the fraud. Since all par­
ties know this is what the Council 
will do, this approach serves as a 
ra ther effective deterrent.
A Broader Caribbean Strategy
These lessons apply to the pre­
election and election stages. The 
Council has also been working on 
issues o f democratic transition and 
consolidation. W hat is needed now 
is a general US strategy to deal with 
the newly em erging democracies 
in a broader Caribbean context.
First, the Caribbean needs to 
break loose from its past depend­
ence on foreign aid and to adopt a 
new economic strategy based more 
on self-reliance. US aid and fi­
nance should com plem ent and re­
inforce, ra ther than substitute for, 
such a program. The new eco­
nomic strategy for the Caribbean 
should include trade liberalization 
with an export-bias; fiscal self-reli- 
ance with an effective tax system; 
economic policy favoring invest­
m ent over consumption; and de-
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regulation and privatization. This 
recipe for success is politically cost­
ly, and that is why it is difficult to 
im plement, let alone sustain. After 
the new policies are im plemented, 
then the US should take a similarly 
bold step to increase aid and mar­
ket access.
The Caribbean Common Mar­
ket (CARICOM) should accept the 
Dominican Republic, Suriname, 
and—if the Aristide regime regains 
power—Haiti, but only after chang­
ing CARICOM’s treaty to guaran­
tee democracy in its current and 
new members. The region should 
agree to the steps it would take as a 
un it if democracy were threatened 
in any country. At the General As­
sembly in June 1991, the Organiza­
tion of American States (OAS) 
walked up to this question for the 
first time and proposed that the 
OAS m eet within ten days of a 
coup in a m em ber country. This 
is a small, bu t encouraging first 
step, which was pu t into practice in 
October 1991 when the OAS de­
nounced the coup in Haiti and im­
posed trade sanctions. Because of 
its long-standing democratic tradi­
tion, CARICOM should advance 
this idea several steps by defining 
the diplomatic, economic, and 
military sanctions that the demo­
cratic community of CARICOM 
would take to prevent military 
coups or to reverse them  if they 
occur.
The US should reinforce these 
Caribbean efforts with a parallel 
strategy, taking a long view and 
realizing that a relatively small 
investment can yield a bountiful 
dividend in assuring a democratic 
and prosperous neighborhood.
The US should offer the Caribbean 
a place at the table of the negotia­
tions for a North American free- 
trade agreem ent. The Caribbean 
should first eliminate tariffs within 
CARICOM and lower its common 
external tariff. But one way to accel­
erate that process is to provide the 
Caribbean with an incentive, and 
nothing would be better than an 
invitation to jo in  a wider North 
American free-trade area. ■
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Suriname Tries Again
by Gary Brana-Shute
O
n Christmas Eve of 1990, 
Deputy Com m ander 
Iwan Graanoogst of Suri­
nam e’s national army 
telephoned the presiden­
tial palace in Paramaribo, 
where a cocktail affair was under 
way, and inform ed the members of 
the civilian governm ent that they 
were dismissed from their posts. 
President Ramsewak Shankar and 
the cabinet dutifully obeyed the 
telephone coup, and Suriname was 
off on another round  of post-coup 
election preparation. Practice 
makes perfect. Following the coup 
in 1980, election preparation took 
seven years; this time it would take 
six months, with elections being 
scheduled for May 25, 1991.
The Christmas Eve coup was 
largely a result of military com­
m ander Desi Bouterse’s fury at be­
ing detained incom m unicado in 
the Netherlands while there with 
President Shankar in early Decem­
ber 1990. Shankar did nothing to 
assist Bouterse, Surinam e’s de facto 
ruler. In a damaging photo— much 
like that o f a helm eted US presiden­
tial candidate Michael Dukakis in a 
tank—Shankar is shown forlornly 
standing in the rain sans paraplu 
outside the Dutch foreign minis­
te r’s residence. Back in Parama­
ribo, Bouterse called Shankar a 
joker and, in a pun on the presi­
d en t’s first nam e, ridiculed him as 
“Ram the Weak.”
Following the coup, an interim  
government, appointed by Bou­
terse and approved by a rum p par-
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liament, was pu t in place, headed 
by the powerless and, some would 
argue, senile septuagenarian Johan­
nes Kraag. The vice president and 
prem ier was the ambitious, tough, 
and smart Jules W ijdenbosch of the 
National Democratic Party (NDP), 
who had headed an appointed gov­
ernm ent in the mid-1980s and 
whose party maintains close ties 
with Surinam e’s powerful military. 
An NDP cabinet including some 
fairly com petent technocrats took 
over the levers of state, dom inated 
the mass media, and began its own 
state-sponsored election campaign.
The power of the 
military—including its 
puppet insurgencies in 
the interior regions— 
neutralized the 
civilian leadership.
Meanwhile the Front, a coalition 
party of Afro-Surinamers, East In­
dians, and Javanese, was caught 
dead in the water. It mobilized for 
the prom ised elections merely by 
renam ing itself the New Front and 
incorporating the small Suriname 
Labor Party into its fold.
Politics in Disarray
The 1980s were a troubled decade 
for Suriname, the polyethnic for­
m er colony of the Netherlands.
The 1980 military coup overthrew 
a fragile parliamentary democracy 
that was based on consociational
agreem ents of proportionality and 
access to financial and political 
resources by the major ethnic 
groups—the Afro-Surinamese, the 
East Indians, and the Javanese— 
each of which was represented by 
its own political party. The military 
and its civilian patrons ruled the 
country until 1987, when elections 
were finally held. The three major 
ethnic groups confederated into 
the Front for Democracy and Devel­
opm ent in order to contest the elec­
tions and, in a public m andate for 
civilian control o f the government, 
won 41 of the 50 seats in the 
national assembly.
Constitutionally the president 
was chief o f state and com m ander 
in chief, while a vice president 
served as premier, a cabinet super­
vised the running of government, 
and a national assembly comprised 
the legislature. Yet none of this cor­
responded to reality. Through the 
military police and com m ando 
units, the military indirectly ruled 
the country. The power of the mili­
tary—including several puppet 
insurgencies in the interior re­
gions—neutralized the civilian lead­
ership. The Front stumbled along 
until the 1990 coup when, morally 
and intellectually bankrupt, the co­
alition m anaged but a whisper of 
protest.
Foreign observers and local 
independent commissions pro­
nounced the May 1991 elections to 
be free, open, and fair. To a large 
degree they were correct, at least 
for the city and coastal countryside. 
Nonetheless, the expansive, jungle- 
covered interior district o f Sipali- 
wini—hom e to several American 
Indian groups and to the sizeable 
Maroon population—was generally 
sealed off from the campaigns of 
the New Front and the third partici­
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pating party, Democratic Alterna­
tive ’91 (DA ’91)—a collection of 
young dissidents who had aban­
doned the New Front. Sipaliwini 
houses five or six insurgent move­
ments, several of which are m anipu­
lated by the military and hence 
support the NDP. Hence, the NDP 
enjoyed access to the area while 
the o ther parties (and the civilian 
police force) did not.
The biggest surprise of the elec­
tions was DA ’91. In a masterpiece 
of organization, DA ’91 mobilized 
in all ten districts of Suriname with 
a scant six m onths of preparation.
In what is usually the political kiss 
o f death in Suriname, the party 
actually discussed concrete and 
thorny issues and did no t pass out 
free food and drink. Young, pro­
gressive, capitalist, and pro- 
Netherlands and pro-US, DA ’91 
successfully united the dissident fac­
tions that had abandoned the New 
Front while playing by the ethnic 
rules of the game. The DA ’91 
mem bership came from the three 
traditional ethnic blocs within the 
old Front plus Maroons, who had 
formerly been taken for granted by 
the old Front’s Afro-Surinamer 
bloc.
In the m eantime, the treasury- 
controlling NDP concentrated on 
grassroots organization in rural 
villages and urban ghettos. This 
campaign strategy was eerily remi­
niscent of 1970s vintage Michael 
Manley with an overlay of Maurice 
Bishop’s socialist populism. As the 
military stayed scrupulously in the 
background, technocrats tinkered 
with their spreadsheets and party 
hacks passed out favors, prom o­
tions, and promises to all who 
listened. Many voters did listen, 
especially the young ones who were 
fed up  with the im potent old tim­
ers of the Front and saw no future 
for themselves in the middle-class 
DA ’91. The NDP prom oted itself 
as ethnically faceless. To some ex­
tent this was true, though the party 
is mainly identified with left-wing 
Afro-Surinamers.
In contrast to the carnival 
jum p-up atm osphere o f the 1987
elections, the 1991 elections were 
somber, a reflection of the public’s 
frustration with the F ront’s inabil­
ity to carry ou t the massive m an­
date of its 1987 victory. The 
prom ised removal of the constitu­
tional clause perm itting military in­
tervention rem ained on the books, 
and ironically the military had 
grown in strength. In addition, be­
neath the jovial, happy-go-lucky 
Suriname spirit was a layer o f para­
noia, spawned by insurgencies in 
the jungle interior and urban ter­
rorism in the form of unexplained 
m urders and drive-by shootings in 
Paramaribo.
Beneath the jovial 
Suriname spirit was 
a layer of paranoia, 
spawned by jungle 
insurgencies and 
urban terrorism.
In the past Surinam e’s elections 
were less about choice than they 
were immense national rituals 
whose outcomes were foregone 
conclusions. Not so now, as voters 
could choose from three major 
parties with distinctive ideas about 
how to run the country. Demo­
graphic, intellectual, and ideo­
logical change had transform ed 
Suriname. The country had be­
come younger and m ore urbane, 
with a new generation of politi­
cians schooled in European and 
T hird World ideologies. Suri­
nam e’s returning emigres were 
unwilling to tolerate the authori­
tarian good ol’ boys.
Electoral Results
The elections yielded few surprises. 
O f the national assembly’s 51 seats, 
the old-guard New Front won 30 
(down from 41 in 1987). The well-
funded, well-oiled NDP secured sec­
ond place with 12 seats (up from 
three in 1987). DA ’91 landed nine 
seats. Smaller parties secured a 
smattering of votes, bu t not 
enough to win seats.
Following the election the New 
Front entered into a tailspin, as its 
unexpectedly poor perform ance 
set off a round of internal bicker­
ing. Aggravating the party’s disar­
ray was its fierce com petition over 
the division of ministerial seats. In 
this context the New Front has 
been determ ined to form a govern­
m ent without cross-aisle coopera­
tion from either the NDP or DA 
’91. T herein lies the hitch: in the 
absence of interparty cooperation, 
a constitutional clause requires a 
two-thirds majority in the national 
assembly to elect a president and 
may bring the political process to a 
grinding halt, possibly clearing the 
path once m ore for military inter­
vention. Yet the constitution has a 
loophole, which the New Front was 
bent on exploiting despite its po­
tential for triggering chaos.
Although Surinam e’s president 
is elected by a two-thirds majority 
o f the 51-member national assem­
bly, the New Front’s total of 34 
seats falls short by four votes. The 
constitution specifies, however, 
that if after two rounds o f voting 
within the national assembly no 
presidential candidate receives a 
two-thirds majority, the selection 
process is thrown into semi-public 
forum  at the level of local People’s 
Councils. These require only a sim­
ple majority to elect a president.
People’s Councils were inaugu­
rated in the 1987 elections in an 
attem pt to reform  the colonial 
political structure. T here are over 
800 council seats, whose distribu­
tion overwhelmingly favors Para­
maribo. In spite o f the New F ront’s 
damaging losses in the 1991 elec­
tions, it m anaged to win more 
than 600 of the council seats. This 
means that while voters indicated 
their displeasure with the old- 
guard leadership of the New Front, 
they rem ained relatively comfort­
able with the New Front as a famil­
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iar political party. In any case the 
New Front won m uch m ore than 
the majority of local council seats 
required to elect a president.
On Septem ber 6, 1991, about 
three m onths after the general elec­
tions, the People’s Council elected 
New Front candidate Ronald Vene- 
tiaan as president o f Suriname. 
Venetiaan, a 55-year-old m athe­
matics professor and m em ber of 
the Afro-Surinamese faction of the 
New Front, received 645 votes 
against 116 for his main rival, for­
m er vice president Jules Wijden- 
bosch, and 56 for DA ’91’s Hans 
Prade.
Does the election of a civilian 
president from the New Front sig­
nal the end o f military dominance? 
Probably not. W hether or not the 
NDP is a military handm aiden, the 
party is on a roll and can anticipate 
future success. After all, the New 
Front will inherit an empty trea­
sury. And weakened as it is, the 
New Front is unlikely to do little in 
the way of serious policymaking. 
W hether the New Front will hold 
together or disintegrate into antag­
onistic ethnic blocs is anybody’s 
guess.
Knowns and Unknowns
T here are several o ther ingredients 
in this political witches’ brew. Do­
mestically, three o f the insurgen­
cies with military connections (i.e. 
those of the American Indian 
Tukuyana, the Angulla Maroons, 
and the Mandela Maroons) could 
substantially increase the civilian 
stress level, as the interior of Suri­
nam e has become divided between 
warlords and the military. Ronnie 
Brunswijk and his Jungle Com­
m ando, who have been fighting 
the military off and on since 1986, 
are hunkered down in a wait-and- 
see posture and may even be collab­
orating with their old enemy. The 
reason is Brunswijk’s goal of becom­
ing warlord king of East Suriname. 
This is only possible with the ap­
proval and compliance of the mili­
tary, which could use Brunswijk to 
protect its narcotics processing and
transshipping operations. In any 
event the military can cast itself as 
protector o f the urban population 
from the “jungle barbarians” (as 
the insurgent groups are perceived 
in Param aribo), perhaps eventually 
in the form o f negotiating a truce.
Internationally there is military 
and nonmilitary posturing, with 
the US and Brazil doing the form er 
and the Netherlands the latter. US 
rhetoric is relatively unimaginative, 
centering on threats of arm ed inter­
vention to dispatch the Suriname 
military once and for all. In the 
afterm ath of US arm ed interven­
tion in Panama and Iraq, however, 
this is an unlikely event. In con­
trast, Brazil continues to support 
Surinam e’s military with handsome 
weapons sales and training pro­
grams, having caught Washington 
and the Hague by surprise with its 
harsh critique of a possible Euro- 
Suriname union as the reestablish­
m ent of a colonial em pire on New 
World shores.
Although signals from the 
Hague are mixed, there is talk of 
reestablishing a commonwealth
relationship with Suriname. This 
would involve monetary union with 
the powerful Dutch guilder; collab­
oration in, or m onitoring of, Suri­
nam e’s foreign affairs; some sort of 
judicial and military coordination; 
and—heavens to colonial Betsy— 
open travel access to the N ether­
lands. The idea has been greeted 
with anticolonial bombast in some 
circles and misty-eyed nostalgia for 
the neocolonial days in others. 
W hether it is serious or not re­
mains to be seen.
With its economy shot and its 
politics in turmoil, Suriname now 
languishes. The military has not 
budged and its closest ally, the 
NDP, has become stronger— 
thanks to free elections. The 
country’s insurgencies and drug 
trafficking continue, while nearly
10,000 M aroon refugees remain in 
French Guiana, uncertain of their 
status and fearful to repatriate 
until a relocation policy is defined 
and their safety guaranteed. What 
will happen next is unclear. There 
m ight ju st be m ore free and fair 
elections around the corner. ■
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Vision for a Free Guyana
by Cheddi Jagan
T his is a crucial time that “tries m en’s souls”—a time o f trem endous changes worldwide. We in the People’s Progres­sive Party (PPP) have rec­
ognized these changes in charting 
a dynamic new course for the na­
tional reconstruction of our coun­
try. Guyana needs sound economic 
policies, involvement for our peo­
ple, and revival of national confi­
dence. We need accountable 
governm ent with a m anagem ent 
orientation free of corruption and 
with transparency in its financial 
affairs.
These features were last seen 
in the PPP governm ent o f 1957 to 
1964. That was the only period in 
our country’s history with a clear 
direction and sustained growth, 
based on the encouragem ent o f pri­
vate capital, a vibrant cooperative 
sector, and with a small, efficient 
and profitable state sector.
Somewhere I heard  the story of 
a couple who wished to rejoin each 
other on their life’s journey. Upon 
inquiring how this could be done, 
the wife was told: “Have faith in 
your partner. Walk confidently 
ahead and he will follow.” The 
wife again inquired: “But how do I 
know he is really coming with me?” 
Came the answer: “If you trust him, 
you will recognize his footsteps.”
I invite you to recognize our 
footsteps. They have left indelible 
prints in the annals of our coun­
try’s search for real development
Editor’s Note: Edited excerpts o f an 
address by Cheddi Jagan, general secre­
tary of the People’s Progressive Party of 
Guyana, to businessmen and profession­
als, on June 8, 1991, in Georgetown, 
Guyana.
and prosperity. The PPP has a 
brilliant track record. We have dem ­
onstrated our capacity to inspire 
production and to invigorate eco­
nomic life. As governm ent in the 
1957-64 period, the PPP showed, in 
spite of harassment, an average an­
nual growth rate o f 7% in bauxite, 
7% in sugar, 8% in manufacturing, 
and 10% in rice. And our vision
If the People’s 
Progressive Party can 
follow its footsteps of 
1957-64, it will make 
Guyana into the 
breadbasket of the 
Caribbean.
produced the Bank o f Guyana, the 
Guyana School of Agriculture, and 
the University of Guyana, which 
some had deem ed ‘pagan’s Night 
School.” We solved problem s in 
electricity, telecommunications, 
drainage and irrigation, transport, 
health, housing, education, and so 
on. The people had abundant and 
cheap food. If we can again follow 
those footsteps, we will make Guy­
ana into the breadbasket or food 
bowl of the Caribbean!
Those footsteps have no t only 
led us to successes in business and 
state m anagement. They were the 
source o f national pride. Every one
of our state enterprises was effi­
ciently managed, providing needed 
services and making profits—Guy­
ana Airways Corporation, Guyana 
Electricity Corporation, Guyana 
Rice Marketing Board, Guyana 
M arketing Corporation, Guyana 
Rice Development Corporation, 
Transport and Harbours Depart­
ment, Guyana Telephone Corpo­
ration, and Guyana Industrial 
Development Corporation. Ours 
was a success story!
O ur prom otion o f industrializa­
tion through Guyanese capital was 
innovative and impeccable. Need I 
rem ind you of the establishment of 
the Ruimveldt Industrial Estate, 
the Industrial Development Corpo­
ration, and the massive agricultural 
schemes—Black Bush Polder, 
Tapakuma, etc.? Need I rem ind 
you of our assistance, including 
crop bonuses and subsidies to farm­
ers, and protection o f Guyanese 
business such as Continental Agen­
cies Paint Factory, Banks Brewery, 
the Chipboard Factory, stone quar­
ries, rice mills, sawmills, etc.?
That legacy, coupled in the 
immediate postindependence pe­
riod with a golden handshake, for­
eign investment, and overgenerous 
US aid, had caused one com m enta­
tor to observe that Guyana would 
become a m odel for the Third 
World. That same com m entator re­
cently wrote that Guyana was bleed­
ing to death. Yet the architects of 
our tragic bloodletting are today 
pleading for another “chance” and 
“continuity”! W hat a shame!
But we must no t forever merely 
look behind us with nostalgia. 
Rather, we must walk boldly for­
ward, in unity and in confidence. 
We must feel fortified only by the 
fact that we made strides before 
and that we can repeat our per-
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formance. We must feel capable of 
making our beloved country ten 
times more beautiful!
Unfortunately we are starting 
from a position of collapsing physi­
cal and social infrastructure, rec­
ord low levels o f production in the 
major sectors of the economy— 
sugar, rice, and bauxite—and alien­
ation of our people, which have led 
to mass migration of our youths 
and of our most productive people. 
The prospects for revival are daunt­
ing and m onum ental and will re­
quire the trust and support of all if 
we are to restore Guyana to its for­
m er splendor. For us, economic re-
uivcil m n c t  h p  K cis p H  n n  tw r»  n i l l ^ r s 1
strate social responsibility. To para­
phrase the words of John  F. Ken­
nedy, the private sector must ask 
not what the country can do 
for it, bu t what it can do for the 
country. As I said at the PPP Port 
M ouran rally: “Now is the time 
when we must all give a little more 
for our freedom; we must care a lit­
tle more for our people; we must 
sacrifice a little more for the great­
er good of our nation and her 
future.”
Since the root-cause 
of the crisis is low 
production, the PPP 
urill go all out to 
reactivate the 
economy. The party 
expects the private 
sector to play a pivotal 
role.
The state sector has taken a lick­
ing, primarily because of political 
interference, leading to misman­
agement. The present rulers have 
helplessly resorted to divestment 
from a position o f weakness and in 
a m anner shrouded in secrecy. The 
PPP holds no dogmatic position on 
divestment. While we see no future 
nationalization, our government 
will critically examine every en ter­
prise in the public sector, and in 
consultation with the business com­
munity and the labor movement 
we will seek out ways to ensure 
their viability.
We will ensure a conductive 
business environment. In this re­
gard a democratically elected gov­
ernm ent will count on the goodwill 
of overseas Guyanese, friendly gov­
ernm ents, and multilateral lending 
agencies to provide the foreign in­
flows to refurbish our infrastruc­
ture and put back on line our idle 
productive capacity, which will 
impact directly on our nation’s 
ability to produce and export. In 
o ther words, we envisage support 
for a mini-Marshall Plan as pro­
posed by the Caribbean Council of 
Churches’ Mission to Guyana. Guy­
ana must maintain its credit worth­
iness, which our rules wantonly 
surrendered for many years. A new 
governm ent will not break with the 
International Monetary Fund, but 
will negotiate modified terms and 
conditions that will not penalize 
our people and affect the ability to 
increase ou tput in the productive 
sector. Experience is showing that 
devaluation, high interest ra te / 
credit squeeze, and wage freeze/ 
wage restraint policies are not only 
contradictory, bu t are the very op­
posite to the intended stabilization 
and recovery.
We believe, as the form er Bar­
badian central bank governor,
Dr. Courtney Blackman, repeatedly 
stated, that devaluation as an instru­
m ent of economic policy has palpa­
bly failed in Guyana. The UN 1989 
world economic survey also noted 
that Bolivia, Ghana, Jamaica, Mex­
ico, and the Philippines, which 
have undergone World Bank aus­
terity measures, have no t funda­
mentally altered their economic 
structure.
Countries like Guyana need re­
flation, not deflation, of the econ­
omy. Businessmen want stability in 
currency and interest rates and a 
strong and independent central 
bank, like the US Federal Reserve 
System. In the m arket economy, 
the way to reflation is a low interest 
rate and the way to attract invest­
m ent capital is a stable currency 
rate.
In Guyana not a low but a high 
interest-rate policy was adopted by 
the rulers. While this was deem ed 
necessary to curb inflation and the 
parallel m arket in currency trad­
ing, at the same time it squeezed 
the local businessmen, thus defeat­
ing one o f the major “recovery ob­
jectives”—increased production for 
export and foreign earnings.
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T his is a crucial time that “tries m en’s souls”—a time o f trem endous changes worldwide. We in the People’s Progres­sive Party (PPP) have rec­
ognized these changes in charting 
a dynamic new course for the na­
tional reconstruction of our coun­
try. Guyana needs sound economic 
policies, involvement for our peo­
ple, and revival of national confi­
dence. We need accountable 
governm ent with a m anagem ent 
orientation free of corruption and 
with transparency in its financial 
affairs.
These features were last seen 
in the PPP governm ent of 1957 to 
1964. That was the only period in 
our country’s history with a clear 
direction and sustained growth, 
based on the encouragem ent o f pri­
vate capital, a vibrant cooperative 
sector, and with a small, efficient 
and profitable state sector.
Somewhere I heard  the story of 
a couple who wished to rejoin each 
other on their life’s journey. Upon 
inquiring how this could be done, 
the wife was told: “Have faith in 
your partner. Walk confidently 
ahead and he will follow.” The 
wife again inquired: “But how do I 
know he is really coming with me?” 
Came the answer: “If you trust him, 
you will recognize his footsteps.”
I invite you to recognize our 
footsteps. They have left indelible 
prints in the annals o f our coun­
try’s search for real development
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address by Cheddi Jagan, general secre­
tary of the People’s Progressive Party of 
Guyana, to businessmen and profession­
als, on June 8, 1991, in Georgetown, 
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and prosperity. The PPP has a 
brilliant track record. We have dem ­
onstrated our capacity to inspire 
production and to invigorate eco­
nomic life. As governm ent in the 
1957-64 period, the PPP showed, in 
spite o f harassment, an average an­
nual growth rate of 7% in bauxite, 
7% in sugar, 8% in manufacturing, 
and 10% in rice. And our vision
If the People’s 
Progressive Party can 
follow its footsteps of 
1957-64, it will make 
Guyana into the 
breadbasket of the 
Caribbean.
produced the Bank o f Guyana, the 
Guyana School of Agriculture, and 
the University o f Guyana, which 
some had deem ed ‘Jagan’s Night 
School.” We solved problems in 
electricity, telecommunications, 
drainage and irrigation, transport, 
health, housing, education, and so 
on. The people had abundant and 
cheap food. If we can again follow 
those footsteps, we will make Guy­
ana into the breadbasket or food 
bowl of the Caribbean!
Those footsteps have not only 
led us to successes in business and 
state m anagem ent. They were the 
source of national pride. Every one
of our state enterprises was effi­
ciently managed, providing needed 
services and making profits—Guy­
ana Airways Corporation, Guyana 
Electricity Corporation, Guyana 
Rice Marketing Board, Guyana 
M arketing Corporation, Guyana 
Rice Development Corporation,
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formance. We must feel capable of 
making our beloved country ten 
times more beautiful!
Unfortunately we are starting 
from a position of collapsing physi­
cal and social infrastructure, rec­
ord low levels o f production in the 
major sectors of the economy— 
sugar, rice, and bauxite—and alien­
ation of our people, which have led 
to mass migration o f our youths 
and of our most productive people. 
The prospects for revival are daunt­
ing and m onum ental and will re­
quire the trust and support of all if 
we are to restore Guyana to its for­
m er splendor. For us, economic re­
vival must be based on two pillars: 
democracy and people. This is the 
heart and soul of our liberal and 
hum ane socialist belief!
It is our cherished belief that 
the hum an factor for mobilization 
and developm ent can thrive only 
in a climate o f freedom  and in an 
environm ent of participatory de­
mocracy. This we can achieve 
under our proposed ethnic-bal- 
anced and class-balanced broad- 
based government—a government 
that must be a partnership between 
labor and capital; a partnership be­
tween local and foreign enterprise; 
a partnership of the whole people 
for the com m on good of Guyana. 
The concepts o f “enemies of the 
state” and “mafias” must have no 
place in a free Guyana!
Since the root-cause of the 
present crisis is low production 
and poor productivity, the PPP in 
governm ent will go all out to reacti­
vate the economy and breathe new 
life into every sector. In this task we 
expect the private sector to play a 
pivotal role. As such, government 
will act as a catalyst to facilitate 
growth by removing red tape and 
allocating resources to stimulate 
productive endeavors. I share the 
view of [Jamaica’s] Prime Minister 
Michael Manley that the state must 
empower the en trepreneur and 
empower the people for devel­
opm ent.
The private sector must not, 
however, expect to be spoonfed.
It must show initiative and dem on­
strate social responsibility. To para­
phrase the words of John  F. Ken­
nedy, the private sector must ask 
no t what the country can do 
for it, but what it can do for the 
country. As I said at the PPP Port 
M ouran rally: “Now is the time 
when we must all give a little more 
for our freedom; we must care a lit­
tle more for our people; we must 
sacrifice a little more for the great­
er good of our nation and her 
future.”
Since the root-cause 
of the crisis is low 
production, the PPP 
udll go all out to 
reactivate the 
economy. The party 
expects the private 
sector to play a pivotal 
role.
The state sector has taken a lick­
ing, primarily because of political 
interference, leading to misman­
agement. The present rulers have 
helplessly resorted to divestment 
from a position o f weakness and in 
a m anner shrouded in secrecy. The 
PPP holds no dogmatic position on 
divestment. While we see no future 
nationalization, our government 
will critically examine every enter­
prise in the public sector, and in 
consultation with the business com­
munity and the labor movement 
we will seek out ways to ensure 
their viability.
We will ensure a conductive 
business environm ent. In this re­
gard a democratically elected gov­
ernm ent will count on the goodwill 
o f overseas Guyanese, friendly gov­
ernm ents, and multilateral lending 
agencies to provide the foreign in­
flows to refurbish our infrastruc­
ture and put back on line our idle 
productive capacity, which will 
impact directly on our nation’s 
ability to produce and export. In 
o ther words, we envisage support 
for a mini-Marshall Plan as pro­
posed by the Caribbean Council of 
C hurches’ Mission to Guyana. Guy­
ana must maintain its credit worth­
iness, which our rules wantonly 
surrendered for many years. A new 
governm ent will no t break with the 
International Monetary Fund, but 
will negotiate modified terms and 
conditions that will no t penalize 
our people and affect the ability to 
increase ou tput in the productive 
sector. Experience is showing that 
devaluation, high interest ra te / 
credit squeeze, and wage freeze/ 
wage restraint policies are not only 
contradictory, but are the very op­
posite to the in tended stabilization 
and recovery.
We believe, as the form er Bar­
badian central bank governor,
Dr. Courtney Blackman, repeatedly 
stated, that devaluation as an instru­
m ent of economic policy has palpa­
bly failed in Guyana. The UN 1989 
world economic survey also noted 
that Bolivia, Ghana, Jamaica, Mex­
ico, and the Philippines, which 
have undergone World Bank aus­
terity measures, have not funda­
mentally altered their economic 
structure.
Countries like Guyana need re­
flation, not deflation, of the econ­
omy. Businessmen want stability in 
currency and interest rates and a 
strong and independent central 
bank, like the US Federal Reserve 
System. In the m arket economy, 
the way to reflation is a low interest 
rate and the way to attract invest­
m ent capital is a stable currency 
rate.
In Guyana not a low but a high 
interest-rate policy was adopted by 
the rulers. While this was deem ed 
necessary to curb inflation and the 
parallel m arket in currency trad­
ing, at the same time it squeezed 
the local businessmen, thus defeat­
ing one of the major “recovery ob­
jectives”—increased production for 
export and foreign earnings.
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The key to a stable currency is 
increased production and produc­
tivity. This can be achieved, consid­
ering our potential natural and 
other resources. What is needed is 
to overcome “man-m ade” problems 
and to attract our Guyanese m an­
power here and overseas. This 
means deliberate policies aim ed at 
reducing the cost of living for the 
working people through subsidies 
o f basic commodities, price con­
trols on selected items, and an 
abundant and cheap supply of 
food. We did this before and we 
can do it again!
It also means real incentives 
for investment. A new government 
will review taxation rates at the 
personal and especially at the cor­
porate levels, including the con­
troversial consum ption tax. We 
recognize that high taxation can be 
counterproductive, reducing the 
ability to mobilize capital to fi­
nance investments for economic 
growth. It also leads to tax evasion 
and capital flight. Additionally, ef­
forts will be made to open up new 
industrial estates, some of which 
will be linked to, and integrated 
with, agribusiness.
Export credit facility will be 
established at interest rates that 
pu t our exporters in a position to 
rapidly increase exports. Red tape 
that adversely affects the efficient 
processing o f applications for in­
centives and hinder production 
and export will be removed.
Insofar as multinational corpo­
rations are concerned, the PPP rec­
ognizes they will bring with them  
capital, technology, m anagem ent, 
expertise, and markets needed in 
our revival drive. In order to attract 
foreign investors into Guyana, we 
will look at a num ber of archaic 
laws such as the “Capital Issues 
Control Act.”
In July 19901 told a group of 
about a dozen American business­
m en in Washington at the office of 
Caribbean and Central American 
Action that they would be wel­
comed, preferably in jo in t ven­
tures, to play a partnership role in 
our economic development; fur­
ther, that they would have, under a 
changed government, the advan­
tage of real political stability. I said 
it must be clear that our economic, 
social, and environmental objec­
tives must be fully recognized, and 
that due regard be given for our 
laws, independence, and sover­
eignty.
In December 1990, in New York 
City, I told the Leucadia Company 
officials that we wanted foreign par­
ticipation, bu t no t as in the days 
when I grew up on a sugar estate, 
and British Guiana was called 
“Bookers’ Guiana.” We want for­
eign capitalized economic growth 
to be in consonance with our na­
tional goals and tem pered with 
social justice.
Let me say a word or two about 
what is described as the “informal 
economy” and as “illegal traders.” 
We adm ire their enterprise and 
drive. We recognize their activities 
grew ou t of distortions in the do­
mestic economy. We will do every­
thing possible to assist them  and to 
bring them  within the overall for­
mal economy. In this regard we will 
consider the reduction o f custom 
duties, especially on foodstuff and 
other consum er items to help 
bring their activities on line.
Foreign investors will 
be welcomed to play a 
partnership role in 
Guyana’s economic 
development, as long 
as they respect the 
country’s economic, 
social, and 
environmental 
objectives.
Your new governm ent will 
strengthen the system of industrial 
relations. The absence of industrial 
strife and trust and confidence be­
tween workers and m anagem ent 
are im portant in our overall strat­
egy of partnership between labor 
and capital and will lead to growth 
and expansion of our economy. In 
this regard we will insist on scrupu­
lous observance o f collective bar­
gaining rights, fair employment 
practices, safe working environ­
ment, and protection for women 
workers. In our national dem o­
cratic state, adequate wages and 
good working conditions are not 
gifts, bu t sound investments.
We believe our party’s dream  
for Guyana is the same dream  of 
the businessmen, the professionals 
as well as the working people. The 
dream  of partnership is vital for 
confidence-building: the confi­
dence o f the people in the future 
of our country, in the currency of 
our country, in the governm ent of 
our country.
It is because o f this common 
dream  and destiny, of this vision of 
what is good for Guyana, that the 
PPP has decided to involve repre­
sentatives o f various socioeconomic 
organizations such as the Cham ber 
o f Commerce, the Guyana Manu­
facturers’ Association, CAGI, the 
Labour Movement, etc., in the 
planning and execution o f the 
programs for reconstruction, eco­
nomic growth, and hum an develop­
ment. It is also for this reason that 
my party rejects “winner-takes-all” 
politics and is including a civic com­
ponen t on its electoral slate.
Given your support and m an­
date, my party intends to form a 
plural democratic governm ent to 
tackle the tasks o f reconstruction 
ahead and to lay the viable founda­
tions for Guyana to en ter the 21st 
century with honor and in prosper­
ity. Let us collectively achieve the 
dreams that all of us so fervently 
share. Let us aim at returning our 
nation to the pedestal it once oc­
cupied in the region. I invite you 
all to jo in  us in this noble en­
deavor. ■
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Fuente de la India, Havana.
Cuba in the 1850s 
Through the Lens of 
Charles DeForest Fredricks
Robert M. Levine 
“Previously unpublished, these 
„  photographs document a
turning point in Cuban life, 
as the island was on the 
verge of social, economic, 
and technological moder­
nity. . .  .This intriguing 
little album will delight 
both students of Latin 
American history and pho­
tography buffs.”— Booklist 
University of South Florida Press 
Cloth $22.95Jamaican Sayings 
With Notes on Folklore,
Aesthetics, & Social Control
G. Llewellyn Watson
“A rich and compelling collection that will make a signif­
icant contribution to the study of Jamaican/West Indian/ 
black folklore and culture.”—Daryl Cumber Dance, 
Virginia Commonwealth University
Florida A & M University Press 
January 272 pp. 6 X 9 Cloth $29.95
Conchtown USA
Bahamian Fisherfolk in Riviera Beach, Florida
Photographs and Text by Charles C. Foster 
Folk Songs and Tales collected by Veronica Huss 
“The combination of folklore, oral history, and photo­
graphs makes this a work of interest to general readers and 
scholars alike.”—Stetson Kennedy
Florida Atlantic University Press 
April 160 pp. 8 1/2X11 Paper $24.95
Amphibians and Reptiles 
of the West Indies
Descriptions, Distributions, & Natural History
Albert Schwartz and Robert W. Henderson 
“A definitive synopsis of West Indian herpetofauna. ”
—George R. Zug, National Museum of Natural History, 
Smithsonian Institution
University of Florida Press 
May 740 pp. 7 X 10 Cloth $75.00
Ne<w from University Presses of Florida
U.S. Policy in Central America 
The Endless Debate
Dario Moreno
“An excellent analysis of the evolution of U.S. Central 
American policies under the Carter and Reagan admin­
istrations that exposes the roles played by competing 
strategic visions and bureaucratic interest groups in shap­
ing two of the most dramatic failures in recent U.S. for­
eign policy.”—Andrew A. Reding, World Policy Institute 
Florida International University Press 
Cloth $26.95 Paper $14.95
Central America and the Middle East 
The Internationalization of the Crises 
Edited by DamidnJ. Fernandez
“This valuable contribution addresses a neglected dimen­
sion of the current crisis and goes far to explain why 
Central American conflict has been so hard to resolve.”
—G. Pope Atkins, U.S. Naval Academy
Florida International University Press 
Cloth $26.95 Paper $15.95
c
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The Libro de las profecias 
of Christopher Columbus 
An en face editon
Translation and commentary by 
Delno C. West and August Kling
“Perhaps the most important 
single volume on Columbus ever 
published in English.. . .  The 
authors’ classification of Columbus’s 
piety as ‘evangelical’ will be contro­
versial, but is exactly right. He was as 
cosmopolitan in his piety as in his 
cosmography.”—Leonard Sweet, 
president, Union Theological Seminary 
University of Florida Press 
May 288 pp. 8 1/2x11 Cloth $49.95
Through your local full-service bookseller, or direct from: 
University Presses of Florida, 15 N.W. 15th St., Gainesville, 
Florida 32611. 904-392-1351. Include $3.00 (UPS) or $2.00 
(bookpost) shipping for the first book, $.50 for each additional 
book. Florida residents add 6% sales tax to book price.
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R E V I E W
Castro’s Premature Biography
by Lisandro Perez
G u errilla  P rince: T h e  U n to ld  
S tory o f  F idel C astro
by Georgie Anne Geyer. Little, Brown 
and Company, 1991. 445 pp. $22.95.
S
omeday, somebody is 
going to write the defini­
tive biography of Fidel 
Castro. None of the ones 
produced thus far, includ­
ing Guerilla Prince: The 
Untold Story of Fidel Castro, can lay 
claim to being that definitive work, 
but, by and large, that is no t the 
fault of those who have written 
about the Cuban leader.
In the case of Georgie Ann 
Geyer, it is clear she has spent years 
doing research, examining every 
source, and interviewing anyone 
who could even remotely shed 
light on the subject. And yet, it is 
still lacking. The main thing it 
lacks is time. It is a prem ature 
biography.
The obvious way in which it is 
prem ature is that, of course, the 
story is no t over. The final chap­
ter—which may turn  ou t to be the 
most revealing and dramatic of 
all—cannot yet be written. But it 
also lacks the research possibilities, 
distance, and perspective that only 
time can give to any biography, 
and especially the biography of 
someone who has been both 
praised and dam ned, loved by 
some and hated by others. The de­
finitive biography of Huey Long,
Lisandro Perez is associate professor of 
sociology and director of the Cuban Re­
search Institute at Florida International 
University. His publications include 
“The 1990s: Cuban Miami at the Cross­
roads, ’’Cuban Studies/Estudios 
Cubanos (1991).
for example, appeared 34 years 
after his death. Time had to elapse 
before some of the most im portant 
inform ants would speak openly, be­
fore the subject would cease to be 
hopelessly m ired in acrimony, and 
before the true impact of the per­
son could be judged. The defini­
tive biography of Castro will need a
The obvious way in 
which the biography is 
premature is that the 
story is not over. The 
final chapter—which 
may turn out to be the 
most revealing and 
dramatic of all— 
cannot yet be written.
biographer as consummate and de­
tached as Huey Long’s. T. Harry 
Williams was a seasoned Civil War 
historian who turned his attention 
to Long without any previous re­
search experience (or baggage) on 
the m an or his era. The work won 
the Pulitzer Prize and the National 
Book Award.
We may no t have to wait as 
m uch as 34 years after Castro’s 
death for his biography, bu t it is 
clear from Geyer’s book that we
have some waiting to do. Along 
with o ther previous biographers of 
Castro, she is unable to maintain 
even a minimal detachm ent from 
her subject. In her case it is evident 
she dislikes the Cuban leader in­
tensely. While her negative per­
spective may well be justified, it is 
seldom kept in check. The result is 
a biography in which the biogra­
pher is at war with the subject, 
stooping at times to innuendo, 
gossip, and gross exaggeration, fre­
quently in tones o f irony and ridi­
cule. For example, the chapter on 
Castro’s economic programs is en­
titled ‘T h e  Dictator o f the Cows” 
and includes passages such as this 
one: “. . .  it was cows that truly riv­
eted him, cows that became the ful­
crum of his obsession to control 
every living thing on his island, if 
not the world . . .  he had created a 
revolution against all odds . . .  now 
he would create new life beyond 
other odds . .  .” (p. 328).
Apparently in an attem pt to 
elicit from the reader contem pt for 
the subject, Geyer frequently goes 
way beyond the data and sources 
into flights of imagination and spec­
ulation that significantly detract 
from the work’s notable contribu­
tions. Those lapses of seriousness 
are exemplified by the following 
unfortunate passage, which should 
have fallen to an editor’s pencil.
It refers to Castro’s visit to the US 
in April 1959: “Everywhere he 
went, the Americans he feared and 
hated lionized him. Men who wore 
proper three-piece suits to the of­
fice and dutifully shaved twice a 
day now, in their fantasies, imag­
ined themselves a Fidel Castro. 
Women with spindly-legged hus­
bands who left their bungalows 
every m orning for desk jobs and re­
turned  tired and irritable at night,
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for a m om ent had the daring to 
see themselves in Fidel Castro’s 
arm s” (pp. 230-31).
Indeed there is a certain ob­
session in this work with Castro’s 
purported  sensuality and with his 
sexual life. Those are, o f course, 
valid topics for any biographer. 
Nonetheless, perhaps because Cas­
tro has been secretive about that as­
pect o f his life, Geyer frequently 
treats it with a tone akin to a tat­
tling expose complete with hearsay 
and trivialities.
This biography suffers from an­
other shortcoming linked to its pre­
maturity. As can be expected, the 
bulk o f the large num ber of inter­
views she has pu t together refer 
exclusively to Castro’s life prior to 
the mid-1960s. O f the 26 chapters 
in the book, only the last four deal 
with Castro’s life since the 1960s. 
The reason is obvious: most of 
Geyer’s informants, those who pro­
vided the material that gave the 
early chapters their richness, are 
living outside of Cuba and had 
parted company with Castro by the 
late 1960s. Those who have been 
by his side since then are no t (yet) 
available to talk.
And so it is that Geyer is able to 
give us details from testimonies 
about Castro’s actions and words 
when he was in high school, at the 
university, and in the Sierra. We 
get vivid images of the night before 
the Moncada, o f the trips to the 
US, and even o f his activities dur­
ing the Bay of Pigs and the Missile 
Crisis. On the o ther hand, there is 
nothing with such biographical 
depth  on the decision to en ter Af­
rica, the Angola campaign, the cri­
sis of the Peruvian embassy, Mariel, 
or the invasion o f Grenada. Those 
events and periods are dealt with in 
the style of history or journalism ,
bu t no t biography. In fact, the last 
four or five chapters are little m ore 
than an overview of the major 
events in Cuban history during the 
1970s and 1980s. There is almost 
exclusive dependence on second­
ary sources and there is little that is 
new to anyone who has followed 
Cuban affairs.
Only the last few 
chapters deal with 
Castro’s life since the 
1960s. The reason is 
obvious: most of the 
informants are living 
outside of Cuba and 
had parted company 
with Castro by the late 
1960s.
Despite all its shortcomings, this 
book is worth reading, if only for 
the early chapters. This is especially 
true for chapters four and five, 
which focus on the years in the uni­
versity and Castro’s initiation into 
politics and violence as well as the 
relation between the two. No other 
biographer of Castro does a better 
jo b  of presenting a coherent pic­
ture of the political socialization 
of the man. Geyer describes how
he learned the im portance o f oper­
ating outside established institu­
tions, that electoral processes 
would get him  nowhere, that it 
was im portant to recognize and 
seize the precise political moment, 
that there should be little hesita­
tion in the use o f violence, and 
that preem ption and vengeance 
were critical for survival. The vola­
tile political climate of the Autentico 
years honed a m ind that, from 
childhood, was exceptionally guile­
ful. After reading those chapters, 
and with the benefit of hindsight, 
one can only conclude that the 
chances were very rem ote that this 
man, once in power, would have 
agreed to establish a participatory 
democracy.
Geyer is at her finest in those 
early chapters. She largely sticks to 
the testimonies she assembled, 
places them  in their proper 
context, and arrives at plausible 
analyses without overreaching, 
trivializing, or engaging in flights 
of the imagination.
Despite, or perhaps because of, 
her dislike for Castro, Geyer insists 
on presenting a picture o f the 
Cuban leader as a political super­
man, a m an with incredible m ental 
resources for the task of political 
survival, for staying ahead and on 
top, for successfully m aneuvering 
and using people to his advantage. 
This is a man who anticipates a situ­
ation and is meticulous in his at­
tempts to control it.
If such a portrayal is accurate, 
and indeed there is little basis for 
arguing against it, it has implica­
tions for anticipating the eventual 
end of Castro’s rule. After reading 
this book, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that Castro’s rule will 
end either on his deathbed or with 
an ignominious whimper. ■
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Structural Adjustment Policies in Argentina
by Marian Goslinga
considerable am ount of current literature on Latin America focuses on programs of economic stabilization 
and structural adjustment, which are central to international political controversies over how to reactivate 
Latin American economies and prom ote their development. In 1991 A rgentina’s structural adjustm ent 
program  under President Carlos Menem has contributed to a dramatic fall in the country’s rate o f inflation 
and the approval of major new foreign loans. But what are the long-term economic and social implications 
of M enem ’s program? The literature listed below dates from 1989.
Ahorro, inversion y financiamiento 
en Argentina y Filipinas: un analisis 
comparado. Jose Maria Fanelli, 
Roberto Frenkel, Guillermo 
Rozenwurcel. Integration Latino- 
americana, v. 167 (May 1991), p. 64- 
89. [Includes a commentary by 
Pablo Gerchunoff.]
Algunas reflexiones y perspectivas 
sobre el endeudamiento extemo 
argentino. Carlos Melconian, 
Rodolfo Santangelo. Monetaria, 
v. 12 (January/M arch 1989), p. 27- 
56. [Discusses foreign exchange 
rates, interest rates, and foreign 
debt conversion schemes.]
Argentina y Brasil: ajuste, creci- 
miento e integracion. Aldo Ferrer. 
Comertio Exterior, v. 41, no. 2 (Febru­
ary 1991), p. 135-44.
Argentina, 1946-1983: The Eco­
nomic Ministers Speak. Guido di 
Telia, Carlos Rodriguez Braun. New 
York: St. M artin’s Press, 1990. 219 
p. $59.95. [Based, in part, on pa­
pers presented at a symposium 
held in Toledo, Spain, 1984. In­
cludes the opinion of each author­
ity on the policy applied and the 
restrictions faced.]
Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri­
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida 
International University.
Argentina: The Farce Continues.
The Latin American Times, v. 10, 
no. 5 (November 1990), p. 1-6.
Argentina: hacia una economia de 
mercado. Fundacion de Investi­
gations Economicas Latinoameri- 
canas. Buenos Aires: Manantial, 
1990. 174 p.
Argentina: Menem Ditches the 
Dogma. Norman Peagam, Charles 
Scott. London: Euromoney Publica­
tions, 1990. 28 p. [1990 Summer 
Supplem ent to the periodical 
Euromoney.]
Argentina: Reforms for Price Stabil­
ity and Growth. World Bank. Wash­
ington, DC: The Bank, 1990. 290 p. 
[Discusses the recent economic sta­
bilization policies.]
The Argentine Economy: Policy Re­
form for Development. Eduardo R. 
Conesa. Lanham: University Press 
o f America, 1989. 124 p. $27.50. 
[Published in cooperation with the 
Center for International Affairs, 
Harvard University.]
Austerity and Regional Develop­
ment Strategy in Argentina and 
Latin America. Alejandro Rofman. 
In Lost Promises: Debt, Austerity, and 
Development in Latin America, edited 
by William L. Canak. Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1989.
Banca central en America Latina: 
selection de textos. Jesus Silva-
Herzog, Ramon Lecuona V., eds. 
Mexico: Centro de Estudios Mone- 
tarios, 1990-91. 2vols. [About the 
experiences of the central banks in 
handling the foreign debt problem  
and financing economic develop­
ment.]
El Banco Mundial y el Plan Baker: 
analisis del caso argentino. Alfredo 
Garcia, SilviaJunco. Boletin Infor- 
mativo Techint (January/February
1989), p. 33-61. [Includes general 
background inform ation on the 
loans received by A rgentina from 
the World Bank and the economic 
policies adopted in accordance 
with the loan agreements.]
Beharrungsinflation und 
“heterodoxe” Stabilisierungs- 
politiek: Erfahrungen aus 
Argentinien, Brasilien und Israel.
Friedrich L. Sell. Kredit und Kapital, 
v. 23, Heft 1 (1990), p. 60-85. [Ex­
amines the causes and characteris­
tics of inertial inflation and the 
reasons for the failure of hetero­
dox stabilization programs in Is­
rael, Argentina, and Brazil in the 
1980s. Summaries in English and 
French.]
El Chaco: una economia “reajus- 
tada.” Andres Rabossi. Realidad 
Economica, no. 6 (1990), p. 121-36. 
[Assesses the economic situation in 
the province of Chaco; concludes 
that regional developm ent policies 
adopted since the 1970s have failed 
to foster economic growth.]
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El control de cambios en la Argen­
tina: la liberation cambiaria y 
crecimiento. Fundacion de Investi- 
gaciones Economicas Latinoameri- 
canas. Buenos Aires: Manantial,
1989. 164 p.
Control de pretios e inflation: la 
experiencia argentina reciente.
Fundacion de Investigaciones Eco­
nomicas Latinoamericanas. Buenos 
Aires: FIEL, 1990. 92 p. [Evaluation 
o f anti-inflation measures, espe­
cially price controls, adopted be­
tween 1983 and 1989.]
The Crisis o f Argentine Capitalism.
Paul H. Lewis. Chapel Hill: Univer­
sity o f N orth Carolina Press, 1990. 
573 p. $49.95. [Focuses on the im­
pact of Peronism and the role of 
pressure groups.]
A Delicate Balance: Confrontation 
and Cooperation between Argen­
tina and the United States in the 
1980s. Aldo C. Vacs. Journal o f Inter- 
american Studies and World Affairs, 
v. 31, no. 4 (Winter 1989), p. 23-59.
Democracy, Distributional Con­
flicts and Macroeconomic Policy­
making in Argentina, 1983-1989.
William C. Smith. Journal o f Inter- 
american Studies and World Affairs, 
v. 32 (Summer 1990), p. 1-42. 
[Traces the economic aspects of 
the transition from military rule to 
civilian government.]
L’economie argentine a l’horizon.
Jorge Schvarzer. Notes et etudes 
documentaires, no. 2 (1989), p. 97- 
1 1 2 .
Estado y grupos economicos, 1983-
1989. Oscar Madoery. Buenos Aires: 
Centro Editor de America Latina,
1990. 125 p. [Discusses Argentine 
economic policy measures.]
Exchange Liberalization and 
Growth: Exchange Controls in Ar­
gentina. Fundacion de Investigaciones 
Economicas Latinoamericanas. Bue­
nos Aires: FIEL, 1990. 45 p.
The Fall o f Labor’s Share in In­
come and Consumption: A New 
“Growth Model” for Argentina?
Adriana Marshall. In Lost Promises: 
Debt, Austerity, and Development in 
Latin America, edited by William L. 
Canak. Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 1989.
Fijacion de precios en la industria 
manufacturera bajo condiciones de 
hiperinflacion: el caso argentino.
Juan  Pablo Villanueva, Juan  Carlos 
Echeverry. Desarrollo Econdmico, 
v. 31, no. 121 (April-June 1991), 
p. 73-89. [Discusses the period
1982-89.]
El financiamiento extemo  
argentino durante la decada de 
1990: agenda y cursos de action.
Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones 
Internationales. Buenos Aires: 
Sudamericana, 1989. 299 p. [Col­
lection of articles dealing with 
measures adopted to deal with the 
Argentine foreign debt problem, 
including a discussion of foreign 
investments.]
From Stabilization to Growth.
RudigerDombusch. Washington,
DC: World Bank, 1990. 52 p. [Pre­
pared for the Second World Bank 
Conference on Development Eco­
nomics, held in Washington, DC, 
April 26-27, 1990, this paper as­
sesses the prospects for the Latin 
American economies in the 1990s.]
El gasto publico en la Argentina, 
1960-1988. Fundacion de Investi­
gaciones Economicas Latinoameri­
canas. Buenos Aires: FIEL, 1991.
Getting Tough, Argentina Tries to 
End Subsidies to Industries that 
Drain the Nation: Severe Foreign- 
Debt Trouble Spurs Efforts to Re­
form a Leaky System o f Taxes. 
Peter Truell. The Wall Street Journal 
(May 31,1988), p. 211-12.
Historia de dos hiperinflaciones: 
de Sourrouille a Erman Gonzalez.
Walter Graziano. Buenos Aires: 
Fundacion Gabriel y Dario Ramos,
1990. 251 p.
IMF Conditionally: Coercion or 
Compromises? Kendall W. Stiles.
World Development, v. 18 (July 1990), 
p. 959-71. [Analyzes IMF decision­
making on its terms of intervention 
and the extent the IMF staff re­
sponds to various economic condi­
tions in the borrowing nations. 
Includes a case study o f Argentina.]
El impacto fiscal del pago de la 
deuda externa: la experiencia ar­
gentina, 1980-1986. Marta Beker- 
man. Desarrollo Econdmico, v. 29, 
no. 116 (January-March 1990), 
p. 529-51.
La inflation argentina contempo- 
ranea: consecuencia de las con- 
ditiones de acumulacion de 
capital. Ruben Leon Guillen.
Realidad Economica, nos. 1 /2
(1990), p. 198-213.
Inflation y estabilization en 
America Latina: nuevos modelos 
estructuralistas. Edward J. Amadeo, 
et al.; Eduardo Lora, ed. Bogota, 
Colombia: Tercer Mundo, 1990. 
[Includes a section on Argentina.]
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Inflation—Are We Next?: Hyperin­
flation and Solutions in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Israel. Pamela S. Falk, ed. 
Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Pub­
lishers, 1990. 166 p. $22.00.
Inflation in Argentina: Stop and Go 
since the Austral Plan. Miguel A. 
Kiguel. World Development, v. 19, 
no. 8 (August 1991), p. 969-86.
La integration en la Cuenca del 
Plata. Antonio Sanchez-Gijon.
Madrid: Cultura Hispanica, 1990. 
278 p. [Appraisal of economic co­
operation am ong countries o f the 
Rio de la Plata basin.]
Los limites de las politicas indus­
tr ia ls  en un periodo de reestruc- 
turacion regresiva: el caso de la 
informatica en la Argentina. Daniel 
Azpiazu, Eduardo M. Basualdo, 
Hugo NochtefF. Desarrollo Econd­
mico, v. 30, no. 118 (July-September 
1990), p. 151-72. [Discusses the ef­
fects of economic policy on the 
electronics industry.]
Las logicas de la economia argen­
tina: inflation y crecimiento.
Guillermo Vitelli. Buenos Aires: 
Prendergast Editores, 1990. 446 p.
El “menu de opciones” y el pro- 
grama de capitalization de la 
deuda externa argentina. Roberto 
Bouzas, Saul Keifman. Desarrollo 
Economico, v. 29, no. 116 (January- 
March 1990), p. 451-75.
Un modelo sin retomo: dificul- 
tades y perspectivas de la econo­
mia argentina. Jorge Schvarzer.
Buenos Aires: CISEA, 1990.
Negotiating Debt: The IMF Lend­
ing Process. Kendall W. Stiles. 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1991. 211 p. [Cites the specific 
experience o f Argentina.]
Observaciones sobre los vinculos 
existentes entre los subsidios y la 
decadencia economica de la Ar­
gentina. Julio J. Nogues. Desarrollo 
Economico, v. 30, no. 117 (April- 
June 1990), p. 86-107. [Criticizes
the governm ent’s recent economic 
policies.]
Opening Late-Industrializing Econ­
omies: Lessons from Argentina and 
Australia. Gary W. Wynia. Policy Sci­
ences (Amsterdam), v. 23 (August
1990), p. 185-201. [Emphasizes 
trade liberalization strategies in the 
1970s.]
La politica economica de Menem: 
del estado de bienester a la 
reestructuration conservadora.
Arnaldo Bocco, Gaston Repetto. 
Realidad Economica, no. 6 (1990), 
p. 5-27. [Analyzes the economic 
orientations of President Carlos 
Menem.]
Politica economica y deuda exter­
na en America Latina. Jose Ramon 
Garcia Menendez. Madrid: Instituto 
de Estudios Politicos para America 
Latina y Africa, 1989. 430 p. 
[Examines the m onetarist policies 
adopted in the 1970s and their role 
in the foreign debt crisis of the 
1980s; emphasizes the countries of 
the Southern Cone.]
Politica industrial: lecciones de la 
experiencia international. Ramon 
O. Fradiani. Boletin Informativo 
Techint (January/February 1990), 
p. 35-61. [Presents options for 
Argentina.]
Political Change and Public Enter­
prise Performance: Argentina as a 
Case Study. Robert E. Looney.
Rivista intemazionale di scienze 
economiche e commerdali (M ilan), 
v. 37 (January 1990), p. 77-91. 
[Measures impact of regime 
change, 1961-81. Also examines 
macroeconomic problems, bureau­
cratic authoritarianism, and na­
tional stabilization.]
Politicas de estabilizacion e hiper- 
inflacion en Argentina. Jose Maria 
Fanelli, Roberto Frenkel. Buenos 
Aires: Centro de Estudios de Es­
tado y Sociedad, 1990. 232 p.
Por que cayo Alfonsin: el nuevo 
terrorismo economico, los per-
sonajes, las conexiones, las claves 
secretas. Luis Majul. Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Sudamericana, 1990.
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Programas de ajuste y estrategias 
politicas: las experiencias recientes 
de la Argentina y Bolivia. Vicente 
Palermo. Desarrollo Economico, v. 30, 
no. 119 (October-December 1990), 
p. 333-66. [This article was re­
viewed by Adolfo Canitrot in De­
sarrollo Econdmico, v. 31, no. 121 
(April-June 1991), p. 125-33; the 
au thor (Palermo) replied to this 
commentary in the same issue on 
p. 134-39.]
The Progress o f Policy Reform in 
Latin America. John Williamson. 
Washington, DC: Institute for Inter­
national Economics, 1990. 88 p. 
[Discusses the Argentine case.]
Public Enterprise at the Cross­
roads: Essays in Honour o f V. V. 
Ramanadham./o/m Heath, ed. Lon­
don: Routledge, 1990. 301 p. [Dis­
cusses experiences and policy 
options, including privatization, 
with emphasis on developing coun­
tries. Includes a case study of Ar­
gentina.]
Radicalismo y empresas publicas,
1983-1989. Aida Arango de Maglio. 
Realidad Economica, no. 6 (1990), 
p. 29-54. [Lists measures adopted 
towards public enterprises during 
the Alfonsin administration; some 
emphasis on privatization policy.]
Reforma del Estado y transfor­
mation national. Carlos Menem, 
Roberto Dromi. Buenos Aires: Edito­
rial Ciencias de la Adm inistration,
1990. 246 p.
Las relaciones de poder economico 
en la Argentina actual: una aproxi- 
macion. Martin Asbomo. Buenos 
Aires: CICSO, 1990. 115 p.
sQue hacer con el Estado?: privati- 
zar para los monopolios o demo- 
cratizar la gestion economica.
Carlos Mendoza. Buenos Aires: 
Ediciones Dialectica. 1990. 127 p.
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